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INTRODUCTION

Imagine, if you will, an enterprising graduate student in
computer programming at a top tier university. One fateful night,
this young man-who for simplicity's sake we will call Eric-grows
tired of working on his master's thesis and is eager for some healthy
procrastination. Inspired by the likes of Project Gutenberg, this
ambitious student decides to design a software program that will
allow him and his fellow students to freely share electronic books (socalled eBooks) for leisure reading outside of the classroom. Rather
than making the books available on a central server or Web site, Eric
instead designs a file-sharing program, which he aptly names
Bookster. Bookster relies on a "peer-to-peer" ("P2P") distribution
network,2 which means that the available books do not reside on a
central server, but rather are shared over a network of autonomous
computer users, who link up with each other using the Bookster
software. Anyone who wants to join Eric's network of bibliophiles
simply downloads Eric's Bookster program, installs it on a computer,
1. Project Gutenberg, founded by Michael Hart in 1971, is the first and largest
collection of electronic books (eBooks) available on the Internet. The collection contains
more than 13,000 literary works, most of which are older and are in the public domain in
the United States. The works are available for downloading in a range of file formats.
Project Gutenberg is a nonprofit organization. The entire collection is maintained by a
team of volunteers. See generally http://www.gutenberg.org (last visited Nov. 29, 2005)
(providing an overview of the Project Gutenberg website).
2. While this Comment will elaborate on the nature of P2P distribution systems, for
a helpful, general understanding of P2P software, see Jesse M. Feder, Is Betamax
Obsolete?: Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. in the Age of Napster, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 859, 863-68 (2003).
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and sets up a user name. Within minutes, the user is capable of
scanning the network for available books and downloading them
from other members' computers. These eBooks can be downloaded
in a matter of seconds and then read on a computer screen, printed
out, or transferred into a hand-held device.
Within a matter of days, most of Eric's friends have joined the
Bookster network; within two weeks, the program's popularity has
reached the undergraduates on campus, who join Bookster at a
feverish rate. Within a month, there are over 500,000 people logged
onto the Bookster network at any given moment in time-students
and non-students alike. And because the available catalogue of
eBooks depends on how many users-and which ones-are logged
onto the Bookster network at a given time, the growth in members
leads, indirectly, to a much richer selection of texts. Mark Twain's
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn-a public domain work no
longer protected by United States copyright law-is the most popular
book that is exchanged over the network; Stephen King's IT,
however, which is a copyright-protected work, ranks a close second.
Meanwhile, our graduate student, Eric, focuses the bulk of his
energy on his voluminous master's thesis, maintaining minimal
oversight over the Bookster network-as the Bookster network is
wholly self-sufficient, little oversight is required in the first place. Nor
does Eric derive any income from Bookster; in fact, his interest in
designing the program stemmed, more than anything else, from his
life-long love of books.
Unfortunately, Stephen King's publisher, Simon & Schuster,
receives word of Mr. King's popularity on the Bookster network.
Simon & Schuster recognizes that it would be unduly burdensome to
track down every person who has downloaded a book from Bookster
during the last few months (not to mention the fact that some of those
downloads were, in fact, freely-exchangeable public domain works).
Therefore, the publisher chooses instead to sue Eric, as the original
designer of Bookster, in a federal district court, alleging contributory
copyright infringement in violation of the United States Copyright
Act.' The publisher demands monetary damages from Eric and asks
that the court issue an injunction to cease the operation of the
Bookster network. Should Eric be liable for contributory copyright
infringement?

3. United States Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2000 & Supp. II
2002).
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On June 27, 2005, the United States Supreme Court-by issuing
its decision in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 4-attempted to
answer that question once and for all, and to settle the doctrinal
confusion that had been escalating between the federal circuits over
the issue of contributory copyright liability. This confusion, which
had gradually percolated its way up to the Supreme Court over a
twenty-year period, was based on fundamentally conflicting
interpretations of the so-called Sony test for contributory copyright
infringement. That test, originally articulated in 1984 in the case of
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,5 set forth what
was intended to be a clear standard for contributory copyright
infringement: the designer of an infringing product, such as a VCR,
would be freed from liability if the product were "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."' 6 While that standard appears to be a
somewhat simple one, it has resulted in severe confusion when
applied to new technologies, such as computer programs. Indeed, in
recent years, the growth of the Internet, as well as the concomitant
explosion of P2P software programs, appeared to be stretching the
Sony doctrine to a breaking point. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit observed as recently as 2004, the
federal circuits found themselves faced with a "fundamental
disagreement" over how Sony's contributory liability standard should
be applied to P2P software.7
The United States Supreme Court's holding this past summer, in
Grokster, sought to ameliorate some of the inter-circuit confusion
over the Sony doctrine and give guidance to both copyright holders
and inventors of new technologies.8 The opinion stated that when an
inventor distributes a technological device "with the object of
promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement," the inventor
4. 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
5. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).

6. Id. at 442. Subsequent courts relied upon Sony's "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" standard as the pivotal focus in cases of contributory copyright
infringement. See, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ'g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706-07
(2d Cir. 1998) (invoking the Sony doctrine where West Publishing Company alleged
contributory infringement by the manufacturers of CD-ROMs that utilized West's starred
pagination system in its Supreme Court CD-ROMs); Ga. Television Co. v. TV News Clips,
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 948 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (finding the Sony doctrine to be unavailing to a
corporate defendant who taped clips from a local newscast for commercial purposes, since
such uses were "not noninfringing use[s] based on Sony").
7. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
8. Grokster,125 S.Ct. at 2770.
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may be held liable as a contributory infringer. 9 The opinion, which
sets forth a fresh theory of liability known as the "inducement rule,""0
seems to suggest that courts must now inquire into the "principal
object"" or the "purpose"' 2 of a given technological device in
determining whether the device's inventor should be held
contributorily liable under copyright law. With respect to our
hypothetical Bookster program, for example, the Grokster case
suggests that Eric-who wrote his program without any clear "object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright"-would not be liable for
the separate infringing acts of Bookster's users.
And yet the contours of the Court's new contributory liability
standard are arguably much less pristine and clear than they could
have been. Indeed, within days of the Court's opinion, copyright
holders and technology companies alike were expressing frustration
with the new inducement standard, arguing that it raised many more
questions than it answered. 3 To make matters more complicated, the
Court articulated its new inducement theory in Grokster without
jettisoning the earlier Sony test; 4 rather, Sony's "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses" test clearly survived the Grokster
opinion, 5 and still remains very much relevant to issues of
contributory copyright liability. That aspect of the Grokster holding
raises numerous problematic questions, such as whether the Sony test
has now been supplemented by an inducement analysis, 6 or whether
the inducement analysis alone should govern where there is explicit
evidence of intent to infringe copyrights. For these reasons, the
Court's opinion in Grokster warrants a much closer examination.
Nor does the Grokster holding raise an obscure issue that should
only be of interest to legal scholars, copyright holders, and software

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 2780.
Id.
Id. at 2774.
Id. at 2781.
See Tom Zeller, Jr., Music Swapping Is Likely To Pause but Not Wither, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2005, at C1 (stating that Grokster provides "little guidance on just how
one might determine whether a company was purposely inducing its users to violate the
law").
14. See Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2778-79 (stating that the Court will "leave further
consideration of the Sony rule for a day when that may be required").
15. Zeller, supra note 13 (quoting Jonathan Zittrain, co-director of the Berkman
Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, and his trenchant observation that
"Sony emerges not in tatters").
16. See Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2792-94 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
importance of preserving the Sony test, while agreeing with the premise that, in cases of a
"specific intent to infringe," contributory liability is appropriate).
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Rather, the outcome of Grokster likely will have
designers.
significant implications for all members of the entertainmentconsuming public. The Court's decision will influence not only the
future of P2P file sharing software, but also the means by which the
public will be able to procure myriad forms of digital content in the
twenty-first century. Thus, the Grokster opinion involves issues that
will have far-reaching ramifications.17 As the vice president of an
Internet music company put it, the legal decisions that are made with
respect to how and whether content should be distributed over the
Internet will
directly shape the market for digital media and the manner in
which digital media are distributed. This in turn will directly
influence the options that are available to consumers, both in
terms of the ease with which they will be able to access digital
media and the equipment that they will require to do so. 8
In addition, the Court's decision in Grokster is noteworthy
because it underscores a classic, eternal dilemma of copyright law 9how to strike a reasonable balance between "the interests of authors
and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the
free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand."2
In other words, the Grokster opinion represents the Supreme Court's
17. See, e.g., CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (6th ed. 2003) ("In 2002, the
core copyright industries (including pre-recorded music, TV programs, motion pictures,
home videos, books, periodicals, newspapers and computer software) accounted for 5.24%
of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product, or $348.4 billion."); Jeffrey Rosen, Editorial, Roberts
v. The Future,N.Y. TIMES, § 6 (Magazine), Aug. 28,2005, at 24, 44 (arguing that one of the
most "important" issues facing then-Supreme Court nominee John G. Roberts, Jr., will be
the future of digital copyright and "the ability of corporations and entrepreneurs, through
the use of copyright ... to control a broad spectrum of intellectual property, from digital
entertainment to genetic sequences").
18. WIPO One Year Later: Assessing Consumer Access to Digital Entertainment on
the Internet and Other Media: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Trade, and Consumer Protection, H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 31 (1999)
(statement of Peter Harter, Vice President, Global Public Policy and Standards,
Emusic.com, Inc.).
19. Craig Joyce and his co-authors note:
The development of copyright
posed by new technologies
expression .... Indeed, the
delayed more than 200 years)
with moveable type.

law has been a continuing response to the challenge
for the reproduction and distribution of human
first copyright statute was a reaction (albeit one
to a new technology of the 15th Century: printing

JOYCE ET AL., supra note 17, at 15.
20. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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best attempt to strike a balance between the traditional "monopoly
interest" granted to artists via copyright law and the larger public
interest. In that sense, the Grokster decision should be of interest to
all members of the public-at stake in the Court's decision are not
only the fundamental rights of writers, musicians, and filmmakers, but
also the broader freedom of every citizen to access, obtain, and enjoy
the myriad fruits of artists' labor via new technologies.
This Comment focuses specifically on the Grokster case and its
likely impact on United States copyright law. Part I of this Comment
traces the evolution of contributory copyright infringement as a
theory of liability and then focuses on the landmark 1984 Supreme
Court case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.
Part II discusses how the emerging field of P2P software has severely
tested the Sony doctrine in recent years. By focusing on three of the
most significant P2P cases to reach the federal appellate level-A&M
22 and
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,21 MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
3
In re Aimster Copyright LitigationZ-Part II highlights the intercircuit schism which the Supreme Court faced when it chose to grant
certiorari to Grokster in late 2004.24 Part III discusses how the
Supreme Court dealt head-on with the issue of contributory copyright
infringement by focusing on the recent Grokster opinion in depth.
Part III posits that while the Grokster Court was wise to preserve the
Sony doctrine, the Court erred by issuing a lengthy and open-ended
opinion in Grokster-one that that will likely prove hopelessly
difficult for the lower courts to implement. Finally, Part IV discusses
the likely impact of the Grokster decision and addresses some
statutory approaches that Congress could pursue in the wake of the
opinion, should the public find it to be somewhat doctrinally
inconclusive or unclear. Part IV then concludes with a discussion of
one scholar's quite innovative statutory solution to the current P2P
software impasse.

21. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
22. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
23. 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
24. See Linda Greenhouse & Lorne Manly, Justices Agree to Hear Case on File
Sharing,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at C1.
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I. THE ORIGINS OF CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY: FROM
GERSHWIN TO SONY

The United States Copyright Act of 197625 (the "Act" or the
"Copyright Act") confers a number of exclusive rights on the holder
of a copyright-among them the exclusive rights of reproduction,
distribution, and public performance.6 The Act makes clear that any
party who violates any of these exclusive rights will be liable as an

infringer.2 7 Although the Act imposes liability for violations of
copyright rights by these so-called direct infringers, no statutory
provision governs the liability of third parties who assist in, or
contribute to, the infringement of copyright.2 8 The doctrine of
contributory copyright liability, 29 rather, is a judge-made doctrine, one

derived from general common law principles."
25.

The purpose of

United States Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 100-1332 (2000 & Supp. II

2002).
26. Id. § 106.
27. Id. § 501. The Act allows for a number of remedies against the infringer of a
copyrighted work, including an injunction, the impoundment and destruction of all
reproductions of the work that violate the owner's rights, a recovery of either statutory or
actual damages, and attorneys' fees. See id. §§ 502-505.
28. The absence of any statutory provision governing contributory liability under the
Act has arguably added to the confusion over the proper scope of the doctrine; courts are
simply unable to refer to clear and concise statutory language when faced with a case of
contributory copyright infringement. This might explain in part why opinions applying the
doctrine of contributory copyright infringement are "startling in their inconsistency."
Feder, supra note 2, at 860.
29. Copyright law has come to recognize two separate theories of liability when a
copyright is infringed by a third party other than the defendant: contributory and
vicarious liability. The lines between the two theories can sometimes blur. See Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 435 n.17 (1984). However, there
remain clear distinctions between the two. Vicarious liability derives from agency
principles of respondeat superior, or "look to the higher up." See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1996). Such liability is typically imposed in
copyright law where a manager, the classic "dance hall operator," exercises both a high
level of control over the infringement and is likely to benefit financially from the
infringement. Id. Sony, and, more recently, Grokster, focused almost exclusively on the
concept of contributory copyright liability, with nary a mention of vicarious copyright
liability. See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 n.9 (2005)
(declining to base its opinion on a vicarious infringement theory, and stating that
"[b]ecause we resolve the case based on an inducement theory, there is no need to analyze
separately MGM's vicarious liability theory"). For that reason, this Comment addresses
vicarious copyright liability only where relevant.
30. It has also been suggested that contributory liability derives in large part from the
implicit language of § 106 of the Copyright Act, which grants to a copyright holder the
right "to do and to authorize" the exclusive rights granted by that section. § 106. The
legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that the use of the phrase "to authorize"
was "intended to avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory infringers." JOYCE
ET AL., supra note 17, at 774. In any event, such liability has been recognized as implicit in
copyright law, despite the fact that it is not expressly mandated in the statute. See
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contributory copyright liability is to "empower copyright owners to
sue the root cause of numerous infringements," rather than having to
sue a "multitude of individuals for direct infringements."'"
The modern doctrine of contributory copyright liability was first
articulated in Gershwin Publishing Corp. v.

Columbia Artists

Management, Inc.32 In that case, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit examined whether a concert promoter should
be liable when musicians performing at the promoter's concerts
played copyright-protected works, thereby infringing on the copyright
owners' exclusive rights of public performance.33 The Second Circuit
found that the promoter should be liable as a result of the direct
infringements that occurred at the concert, under theories of both
contributory and vicarious liability. With respect to contributory
liability, the court held that such liability would be entirely
appropriate where a defendant, "with knowledge of the infringing
activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing
conduct of another."34 The Gershwin court thereby established the
two main prongs of the modern contributory copyright liability
analysis: (1) knowledge of a direct infringement by a third party and
(2) a material contribution to that infringement.
Thirteen years elapsed between the Second Circuit's holding in
Gershwin and the seminal United States Supreme Court case
construing contributory copyright liability, Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. In Sony, Universal Studios and Walt

Disney Productions, the owners of a number of copyright-protected
motion pictures, filed suit against Sony, the manufacturer of the
newly-developed Betamax video tape recorder ("VTR").35 The
plaintiffs first asserted that the VTR was being used to record
copyright-protected works off of the television airwaves and that such
actions infringed on the owners' exclusive rights under the Copyright
Act.36 Rather than suing each direct infringer for the unauthorized
copying of the plaintiffs' films, the plaintiffs chose to sue Sony,
Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 261 ("Although the Copyright Act does not expressly impose liability
on anyone other than direct infringers, courts have long recognized that in certain
circumstances... contributory liability will be imposed.").
31. Brandon Francavillo, Pretzel Logic: The Ninth Circuit'sApproach to Contributory
Copyright Infringement Mandates that the Supreme Court Revisit Sony, 53 CATH. U. L.
REV. 855, 861 (2004).

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1160.
Id. at 1162.
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,421-22 (1984).
Id. at 420.
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alleging that its manufacturing and marketing of the VTR should
make it liable for contributory copyright infringement.37
The findings of fact at the district court level revealed that a large
majority of VTR owners used the VTR for "time-shifting"-that is,
recording a program in order to watch it at a later time-and that a
majority of the films that were tape-recorded were undoubtedly
copyright-protected works.3" This common practice required the
court to address both the thorny issue of whether home copying by
private VTR owners directly infringed the copyright right of
reproduction, as well as the separate question of whether the VTR
manufacturer, Sony, should be liable on a contributory liability
theory.3 9
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
defendant Sony.4" First, the district court concluded that private
home copying constituted a "fair use" under § 107 of the Copyright
Act41 and was, therefore, not an infringing act.42 As an independent
ground of decision, the court held that even if home copying were a
direct infringement, Sony could not be liable as manufacturer on a
contributory liability theory since it lacked the requisite knowledge
that consumers were using the VTR to infringe plaintiffs' works.43
Moreover, the court held that even if Sony had "constructive
knowledge" of the infringements being committed by VTR users, it
lacked the other essential element required for contributory liability:
a material contribution to those infringements.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court.45 First, the court held that VTR
home copying was not a fair use, but was rather a direct infringement
37. Id.

38. Id. at 421.
39. See, e.g., PAUL

GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY:

FROM GUTENBERG TO

THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 130 (1994) (describing the issue of whether private copying as a

direct infringement is a particularly problematic one, since "[p]rivate copies can also have
commercial consequence").
40. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D. Cal.
1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
41. United States Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The "fair use"
provisions of the Copyright Act provide that the use of a copyrighted work in certain
activities, such as, for example, "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, ...
scholarship or research," will not be deemed to be an infringement of copyright. Id. The
Act thereby provides a sort of "safe harbor" for certain uses of copyrighted works.
42. Universal City Studios, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
43. Id. at 460.
44. Id. at 461.
45. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981),
rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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of plaintiffs' copyright-protected works on a massive scale. 6
Moreover, the court held that Sony should be held liable for
contributory copyright infringement. According to the court, Sony
could be charged with knowledge of the VTR users' infringements
because the reproduction of copyrighted works was clearly "the most
conspicuous use" of the VTR.4 7 In addition, the Ninth Circuit
evidently concluded that Sony had "materially contribute[d]" to the
infringement of plaintiffs' works by manufacturing the VTR, since
VTRs were sold "for the primary purpose of reproducing television
programming."4 8
The evolution of the Supreme Court's opinion in Sony is a
circuitous one to say the least. The Supreme Court first heard
arguments in Sony in January 1983 and appeared ready to affirm the
Ninth Circuit's holding by a vote of 5-4, with a majority opinion to be
written by Justice Blackmun.4 9 However, Justice Stevens, who at the
time anticipated writing a dissenting opinion in the case, expressed
clear ambivalence about a ruling announcing that private home
videotaping constituted copyright infringement; he thought such
private copying should perhaps be viewed as a fair use."° As Justice
Stevens circulated memoranda to the other Justices about the home
copying issue, some-including Justice Powell-began to doubt the
majority decision to affirm the Ninth Circuit."l Justice Stevens had
shifted his view towards an approach to contributory liability that
would exonerate Sony on the basis that private home recording did
not constitute an infringing reproduction under the Act.52 Justice
Brennan, meanwhile, joined the debate by proposing a "third
53
alternative" to Blackmun's and Stevens's approaches to liability.
Under Brennan's proposal, Sony would not be held liable as a
contributory infringer since the VTR had a "substantial noninfringing
use."5 4 Stevens gradually incorporated Brennan's "third alternative"
suggestions into his proposed opinion, bringing those proposals
46. Id. at 971-72.
47.

Id. at 975.

48. Id.
49. See Jonathan Band & Andrew J. McLaughlin, The Marshall Papers: A Peek
Behind the Scenes at the Making of Sony v. Universal, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 427,
432-33 (1993).
50. Id. at 432-33; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 150.
51. Band & McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 433.

52.
STATE

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND RELATED
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL
DOCTRINES:

747-48 (5th ed. 2004); Band & McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 432-35.
53. Band & McLaughlin, supra note 49, at 437-38.
54. Id. at 438.

PROPERTY
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together in what was beginning to look like a majority opinion rather
than a dissent.55 However, due to an inability of the Justices to reach

a consensus, a ruling on the case was delayed, and the Court reheard
oral arguments in October 1983.56

Justice O'Connor eventually

joined the Stevens/Brennan camp, providing the swing vote in favor
of reversing the Ninth Circuit.5 7 At that time, it became clear that
Justice Stevens's anticipated dissent would indeed be the majority

opinion, and Justice Blackmun's proposed majority opinion would
become the dissent.
However, the issue of private copying and "fair use" remained a
particularly difficult one among the five majority Justices. Justice

White, therefore, suggested that the majority opinion elude the issue
of private copying entirely, addressing solely the issue of Sony's
liability as a contributory infringer. 58 As a result, the Sony majority
opinion never directly addresses whether private home copying is a

direct infringement; rather, the opinion presumes that it is, and
focuses its attention solely on whether and when a manufacturer of an
infringing item can be held liable on a contributory liability theory.
The Sony majority commenced its analysis by observing that the
VTR can be used to record both copyrighted and non-copyrighted

works alike-according to the Court, the invention had a "range of
... potential use[s]. 59 Drawing an analogy to patent law, the
majority noted that the Patent Act's' definition of patent
infringement exempted from liability those "staple article[s] ... of

61
commerce" that are suitable for "substantial noninfringing uses."
The Court construed the "substantial noninfringing use" language in

55. Id. at 444-47.
56. Id. at 447.
57. See id. (discussing a note from Justice O'Connor in which she states that she is
"closer to Justice Stevens' opinion than to any 'other on the table' ").
58. Id. at 439-40 (citing a memo in which Justice White proposes "reversing on
contributory infringement grounds without deciding the question of the homeowners").
59. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437 (1984).
60. United States Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
61. Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-41. The Patent Act makes clear that patent protection must
be narrowly limited to the invention described in the patent claim, and cannot extend to
other "staple article[s] or commodit[ies] of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use." See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). Prior to its codification in the Patent Act, the
Supreme Court invoked the "staple article of commerce" doctrine in patent cases to
prohibit patent holders' attempts to extend the scope of their patent protection. Thus, for
example, the doctrine prevented the owner of a patent in film-projection equipment in his
attempt to block competitors from selling other types of film that could be used on its
projectors. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517
(1917). The Supreme Court cited to the Motion Picturecase in discussing the intent of the
"staple article" doctrine. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
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the Patent Act as standing for the more general premise that where
an invention is potentially used for patent infringement, but is also
adapted for other lawful, noninfringing uses, those facts alone would
not be sufficient to hold the inventor liable as a contributory
infringer.62
Relying on this patent law analogy, the Court held that in a
copyright context a party could not be liable as a contributory
infringer solely on the grounds that he manufactured and sold an item
of copying equipment (such as, in this case, a VTR). Rather, the
Court held that if a copying item were capable of "substantial" or
"commercially significant noninfringing uses," the manufacturer
would not be liable for contributory copyright infringement.6 3
Using that definition as a departure point, the Sony majority
then addressed whether the VTR was capable of "substantial" or
"commercially significant" noninfringing uses. The Court stated:
In order to resolve that question, we need not explore all the
different potential uses of the machine and determine whether
or not they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need
only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the
District Court a significant number of them would be
noninfringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we need
not give precise content to the question of how much use is
commercially significant. For one potential use of the Betamax
plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private,
noncommercial time-shifting in the home.6
In light of the district court's finding that "the primary use of the
machine for most owners was time-shifting "6 5 -i.e., recording a show
for later viewing-and that a "significant quantity" of that timeshifting was expressly authorized by the likes of PBS, the National
Football League, Major League Baseball, and the National Religious
Broadcasters,6 6 the Court concluded that the VTR was "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. "67
62. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Id. at 423.
66. Id. at 444-45.
67. Id. at 442. In support of its conclusion, the Sony majority observed that plaintiffs'
combined market share of all available television programming was well below ten
percent, and that allowing plaintiffs to enjoin all uses of the VTR would "have a significant
impact on both the producers and the viewers of the remaining 90% of the programming
in the Nation." Id. at 443. The Court claimed that the plaintiffs would have had a
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Justice Blackmun's dissent did not elide the issue of home
copying as the majority did. Rather, he felt the Copyright Act made
clear that "the making of even a single videotape recording at home"
was an infringement of copyright.6 8 Justice Blackmun also expressed
doubts about the majority's finding that the VTR was capable of
substantial noninfringing uses. While he agreed with the premise that
contributory liability would be inappropriate if a significant portion of
the product's use was clearly noninfringing, Justice Blackmun felt that
the majority's analysis mistakenly focused on the proportion of
television programming that was copyrighted--contrasting plaintiffs'
ten percent market share with those non-copyright protected shows
on PBS-rather than on the "amount of VTR usage that [was]
infringing."6 9 Justice Blackmun also intimated that greater attention
should be paid to the intent that lay behind an infringing product such
as the VTR. As he put it, if a manufacturer of a product such as the
VTR were "purposefully profiting" from an infringement, liability
would be "appropriately imposed."7 He concluded by arguing that
the case should be remanded for an examination of "the proportion
of VTR recording that [was] infringing."7 1
Although Sony has remained the cornerstone case construing
contributory copyright liability, the opinion has been subject to
withering criticism over the last two decades, from academics and
industry moguls alike. Jack Valenti, President of the Motion Picture
Association of America, once claimed that the opinion raises
significant questions about whether "copyright is real or whether it is
mush."7
Others have alleged that Sony suffers from "clouded
73
reasoning," and that "good sense ... is unhappily absent from much
of the opinion[]."7 4
stronger case if they had been able to speak for "virtually all copyright holders with an
interest in the outcome." Id. at 446.
68. See, e.g., id. at 463-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[TJhere can be no question that
under the Act the making of even a single unauthorized copy is prohibited.").
69. Id. at 492. Justice Blackmun found it inappropriate that the Court's "substantial
noninfringing use" analysis honed in on the fact that "substantial numbers of copyright
holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object" to
having their shows recorded. See id. at 456 (majority opinion). Justice Blackmun
apparently felt that the emphasis on which television shows were being taped was
misplaced and that the focus should have been on the copying instrument.
70. Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 492.
72. Richard Stengel, Decision: Tape It to the Max: The Supreme Court Says a VCR

Switch in Time is Not a Crime, TIME, Jan. 30, 1984, at 67.
73. See Francavillo, supra note 31, at 863.
74. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair'sFair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1153 (1990).
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Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, a final point should
be made about the underlying copyright "values" that imbued the
Sony opinion. The Sony majority commenced its analysis with a
discussion of the underlying purposes of copyright: to grant authors a
limited monopoly in their works and to allow the public access to
those works after the limited period of control has expired.75 After
pointing out that it is Congress's role to grant and refine the scope of
copyright protection, the Sony Court underscored the vital
importance of striking a balance "between the interests of authors
and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in the
free flow of ideas, information, and commerce" on the other.7 6 In
other words, the Sony majority was keenly aware of the fundamental,
eternal dilemma of copyright law: whether to expand protection so
that authors and artists can capture a work's value in the market place
or to withhold protection so that the public may freely enjoy copies of
the work via a particular technological innovation.7 7 The Court's
articulation of the doctrine of contributory liability-based on
whether a product is capable of substantial noninfringing usesrepresented its attempt to strike a balance between copyright holders
and the consuming public. Whether or not Sony properly struck that
balance was the essential question facing the Supreme Court twentyone years later in Grokster, when it was forced to revisit Sony in the
context of P2P software.
II. PEER-TO-PEER SOFTWARE AND THE INTER-CIRCUIT SCHISM
OVER SONY

To be sure, the Sony opinion, with its "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" test for contributory copyright liability, left many
questions remaining. Most notably, the Sony Court made clear that it
would not give "precise content to the question of how much use is
commercially significant,"78 and its failure to give more guidance on
that issue has led to some inconsistent results among the circuits.79
75. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429.
76. Id.
77. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 37.
78. Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
79. Compare Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 264-67 (5th Cir.
1997) (applying Sony and holding that a software designer that created a program to
"unlock" a protection on a computer program diskette-thereby allowing computer users
to make an "unlimited number" of copies of a program-was not liable in the presence of
a single noninfringing use), with Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1373-75 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (applying Sony and allowing for
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But where confusion over the Sony doctrine frequently arose, the
growth of P2P technology in the last five years at times appeared to
stretch the doctrine to its breaking point.80
P2P software8 programs are mechanisms by which an
independent network of computer users (so-called peers) is created.82
Unlike a typical Internet network, the information accessed over a
P2P network does not reside on a central server or host computer;
rather, each computer makes the information available to every other
computer in the network.8 3 The software is necessary to connect
users with other users of the software, thereby creating a network.
The network, in other words, is built by connecting the hard drives of
all of the users of the same or similar software, creating an available

index of files (i.e., music files, photos, or documents) that can be
freely exchanged among all users in the network.' 4

contributory liability of a computer bulletin board service operator for the posting of
copyright-protected excerpts of books, despite the fact that the large majority of the
message posts on the bulletin board were noninfringing).
80. Ryan Roemer, The Digital Evolution: Freenet and the Future of Copyright on the
Internet,2002 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 1-3.
81. A brief note about the phrase "peer-to-peer software." The phrase has been
made famous by file-sharing software programs like Napster, Grokster, and the likeprograms that are the focus of this Comment. But it should be pointed out that the phrase
"peer-to-peer software" more generally refers to any program creating a network on
which a number of independent computer users are able to "link up" with each other
without the need for a centralized server or host. See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin,
112 YALE L.J. 369, 375-76 (2002). P2P systems can be broadly categorized as falling under
either "peer production" or "peer distribution." Id. In a program implementing a "peer
production" system, users are allowed to connect and collaborate on the production of a
large body of work, such as, for example, academic research. Id. at 381-82. One example
of a peer production system is currently being used by NASA; this system, called the
"clickworker" production system, allows a number of "NASA clickworkers" to
independently review NASA's satellite photographs of a planet's moon via the Internet,
analyze them closely, and work collaboratively to produce a detailed map of the moon. Id.
at 384-85. In contrast, in a "peer distribution" system, such as Napster, a network of
independent distributors is created with the software, at which point files can be
distributed-i.e., freely exchanged-among all users in the network. Id. at 397. Although
this Comment specifically uses the phrase "peer-to-peer software" in referring to Napster,
Grokster, and the like, it should be noted that this Comment is more generally referring to
file-sharing software programs that create "peer distribution" systems.
82. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated,
125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
83. Id.
84. Id. Over the years, the designers of P2P distribution systems have developed
different methods of indexing the files that are shared among users. One method is to use
a centralized indexing system, maintaining a list of all available files on a centralized
server. Feder, supra note 2, at 862-68. Another is to have a completely decentralized
system, in which each computer maintains a list of files available on that computer only.
Id.
Somewhere between these two extremes-the centralized system and the
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The problems that P2P software programs pose to copyright
holders are legion and well documented.
Copyright law has
historically relied upon a "gatekeeper" model of distribution,
whereby the copyright holder, by virtue of § 106 of the Copyright Act,
is granted exclusive rights of reproduction and distribution.8 5 As a
result, historically, anyone wishing to publicly distribute an artistic
work-a book, film, or a compact disc-would have to negotiate with
the rights-holding gatekeeper-the publishing company, the film
studio, or the record company-for permission to do so. 6 As a
corollary, these gatekeepers were able to prevent evasion of copyright
law by blocking opportunities to buy an infringing product in the first
place.8 7
The advent of P2P software programs has undermined this
traditional model by completely eliminating the need for any
gatekeeper/intermediary." The goal of a P2P distribution system is,
after all, to create "a network of perfect equals, each of which is both
a consumer and a distributor."89 In the late 1990s, copyright holders
gradually became aware of the clear and present threat that P2P
software posed to their exclusive rights of distribution. Supported by
industry association groups such as the Recording Industry
Association of America ("RIAA"), copyright holders decided to
commence a series of contributory infringement lawsuits against the
designers of these programs, starting with the most ubiquitous
offender, Napster. 9° The copyright owners assumed at the time that it
would be less costly-and more effective-to seek a judgment against
a single secondary infringer rather than pursing a multitude of direct
infringers. 91
decentralized system-is a "supernode" system, in which a select number of computers on
the network are designated as the primary indexing servers. Id.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000 & Supp. II 2002); Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 679, 712 (2003).

86. Wu, supra note 85, at 715.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 717; see also Benkler, supra note 81, at 397 (describing software that is
"intended to allow users to set up a peer-based distribution system that will be
independent of the more commercially controlled distribution systems").
90. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd,
380 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright
Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 1107 (2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal.
2000), affd 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
91. Feder, supra note 2, at 872. As is discussed in the pages that follow, that
traditional assumption was tested by the outcome of some of the P2P cases. In fact, once
the RIAA realized that they might not be able to impose liability on a secondary infringer,
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The results of these lawsuits, however, proved to be less than
conclusive. While there was little dispute that the end-users of P2P
file sharing systems were frequently infringing on copyright by
downloading copyright-protected works, it was not at all clear that
Sony's contributory liability test should support the imposition of
liability on the designers of these programs-especially as many P2P
programs arguably satisfied Sony's "capable of substantial
noninfringing use" threshold.9 2 Not only were many of these lawsuits
unsuccessful-much to the chagrin of the RIAA-but they also
underscored the severe schism between the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits over how the Sony doctrine should be applied to P2P
software.93
The first major case to construe the contributory liability of a
P2P software designer was the Ninth Circuit's opinion A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc.94 Napster was a P2P program, which operated by
using an internal platform known as MusicShare.9 5 The Napster
program enabled users of the P2P network to freely exchange
copyright-protected music files in an MP3 format.9 6 Napster was a
hugely successful program, boasting at one point as many as eighty
million registered users on the network.97 The plaintiffs, a large
they shifted strategies, and began pursuing lawsuits against individual downloaders. These
strategies have been well-documented. See, e.g., Robyn Axberg, File-sharingTools and
Copyright Law: A Study of In re Aimster Copyright Litigation and MGM Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 389, 390 (2003) (stating that the new strategy of suing
individuals directly followed the RIAA's unsuccessful lawsuit against Grokster's

distributors).
92. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 85, at 726 (claiming that P2P designers are advantaged by
"a specific legal doctrine-copyright's contributory liability doctrine").
93. Elizabeth Miles, Note, In re Aimster & MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.: Peer
to Peer and the Sony Doctrine, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 21, 34-35 (2004). Miles's Note,
written before the Ninth Circuit's holding in Grokster and before the Supreme Court's
decision to step into the P2P debate, highlights some of the problems that P2P software
has wrought on the doctrines of contributory copyright infringement. After discussing

some recent P2P cases, Miles engages in a thorough critique of Judge Posner's opinion in
the Aimster case, see infra notes 132-53 and accompanying text, characterizing it as a
departure "from previous case law in both procedure and substance," Miles, supra, at 42.
Miles also highlights the arguments on both sides of the P2P issue that are currently being
played out in the public sphere. Id. at 43-46. With respect to the doctrine of contributory
liability, Miles concludes that the Sony test is plainly "inapplicable to present realities,"
and therefore needs to be jettisoned in the P2P context. Id. at 52.
94. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
95. Id. at 1011.

96. Created in 1987 by the Moving Picture Experts Group, an MP3 is a standard file
format for the storage of audio recordings in a digital format. MP3s are compressed files,
which allows for rapid transmission of digital audio files from one computer to another by
electronic mail or any other file transfer protocol. Id.
97. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 67 (2004).
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number of copyright owners, sued Napster in federal district court in
California, alleging theories of both contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement.9 8 The district court found a likelihood of
success on the contributory infringement claim and granted an
injunction to the plaintiffs, ordering Napster to refrain "from
engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading, uploading,
transmitting, or distributing plaintiffs' copyrighted musical
compositions and sound recordings, protected by either federal or
state law, without express permission of the rights owner."99
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit commenced its analysis of Napster's
contributory liability by setting out the two familiar elements of
contributory infringement: (1) knowledge of a direct infringement
and (2) a material contribution to that infringement. 0 0 With respect
to knowledge, the court found that defendant Napster had "actual,
specific knowledge" of the infringements taking place on its network,
that Napster had the potential to stop those infringements by
blocking access, and that it failed to do so.'
With respect to
Napster's "material contribution," the court found that Napster
provided the site and facilities for the infringing activities by
maintaining indexing central servers and providing technical support
to its users. 102
The Ninth Circuit found the Sony doctrine to be unavailing to
Napster. 103 The court of appeals agreed with the district court that
Napster had plainly failed to demonstrate that it was "capable of
substantial noninfringing uses."1" The court briefly reprimanded the
lower court, however, for its analysis of the substantial noninfringing
use test. 05 According to the court, the district court had erroneously
focused its attention on the "proportion" of current infringing uses to
noninfringing uses.'0 6 Rather than focusing on the proportion of uses,
the appellate court found that the proper focus of a Sony inquiry

98. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd, 239 F.3d 3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
99. Id. at 927.
100. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019 (citing Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists
Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
101. Id. at 1020.
102. Id. at 1022.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1021.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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should usually be the system's "capabilities," including current and

future uses.107
The Ninth Circuit also took a moment to clarify the requirements
of the Sony doctrine.

Construing Sony as requiring a heightened

knowledge threshold, the Ninth Circuit found that when a system is
capable of substantial noninfringing uses, mere constructive
knowledge of the infringement could not be imputed to a

defendant.10 8 Rather, according to the court's reading of Sony, where
a product was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses," only the

presence of "actual, specific knowledge" would justify the imposition
of contributory liability."0 9 Since the court found that Napster
possessed such knowledge, however, the court held that liability was
wholly appropriate--even had the program been deemed capable of

noninfringing uses."0
The Ninth Circuit had occasion to revisit Sony as applied to P2P
software in MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd."' Although the
issues in Grokster were similar to those of Napster, the technology
was quite different.
Where Napster owned and operated a

centralized server that was subject to its direct control, the P2P
software involved in Grokster utilized decentralized

(or quasi-

decentralized "super node") networks which were much more
difficult for their designers to control 1 2 Indeed, the evidence
suggested that the two defendants in Grokster-software distributors
Grokster and StreamCast, which distributed the technology platforms
107. Id. (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit emphasis on a product's "capabilities,"
albeit redolent of dicta, clearly set the stage for the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Grokster.
Id. By placing the emphasis on a product's "capabilities" and downplaying the question of
whether those capabilities were "substantial," the court created a model under which a
number of P2P products would be at least capable of noninfringing uses. According to the
Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sony, for example, if 1,000 copies of a copyrightprotected Eminem song were downloaded over a P2P system, but the system had the
capability-present and future-of allowing users to download 100 of Beethoven's public
domain works, then the system would be deemed "capable of noninfringing uses" and
(without an actual analysis of the "substantiality" of those uses) the designer would be free
from contributory liability. Although the court did not fully develop this view in the
Napster opinion-deferring instead to the district court's finding that Napster knew its
users' infringements of plaintiffs' copyrights and upholding liability on that basis, id. at
1021-the approach hinted at in Napster became the Ninth Circuit's official position in
Grokster,where the product's "capabilities" exonerated the defendants from contributory
liability.
108. Id. at 1020.
109. Id.; Religious Tech. Center v. Netcom On-Line Commc'ns Servs., Inc., 907 F.
Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
110. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
111. 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
112. Id. at 1159.
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FastTrack and Morpheus, respectively-intentionally structured their
P2P platforms to avoid the centralized control that doomed
Napster. 113
As in Napster, the plaintiffs in Grokster were a large number of
copyright holders." 4 They sued defendants Grokster and StreamCast
in federal district court in California, alleging that the distribution of
their technology platforms constituted contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement." 5 In contrast to Napster, however, the
district court in Grokster refused to hold the defendants liable for
contributory copyright infringement. First, the district court found
that the software was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses," and
therefore, under the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the Sony
doctrine in Napster, only "actual knowledge" of infringing acts would
justify the imposition of contributory liability." 6 The district court
found no such evidence that defendants had "specific knowledge" of
infringing acts, especially in light of the highly decentralized nature of
the P2P program being used. 7 In addition, the district court
concluded that there was no material contribution by the defendants,
since infringing files did not reside on the defendants' computers and
they lacked the ability to suspend infringing users.1
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confirmed its reading of Sony as
first articulated in Napster-namely that if a product were capable of
substantial noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge could not be
imputed to the defendant and the plaintiff would have to show
"knowledge of specific infringing files.' 1 9 Based on that reading of
Sony, the court analyzed whether the defendants' P2P platforms were
capable of substantial noninfringing uses. In light of a number of
public domain works which were exchanged over the Internet using
defendants' technology-not to mention lesser-known artists such as
Wilco that have consented to having their works liberally circulated
on P2P systems-the court concluded that the defendants' technology
113. See Wu, supra note 85, at 731-34 (citing "an intentional effort ...to avoid a
lawsuit" by limiting the level of control exercised over such P2P programs as Gnutella,
Kazaa, and Grokster); see also Miles, supra note 93, at 29 ("[I]n Napster's wake, peer-topeer coders designed systems they hoped would satisfy the Ninth Circuit and like minded

courts.").
114. 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031 (C.D. Cal. 2003), affd, 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1031-36.
117. Id. at 1036.
118. Id. at 1041-43.
119. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
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was clearly "capable of substantial noninfringing uses." 120 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the vast majority of works being
shared on the defendants' computers were infringing uses, stating that
Sony merely requires that a product be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses."2
Since the software at issue met the Sony threshold, the court held
that the defendants would only be liable if there was evidence of
specific knowledge of infringements. As the defendants did not
operate a centralized indexing server (as Napster had), and since they
lacked any ability to stop infringing files from being shared (once the
program was installed on a user computer, the defendants no longer
had any control over the network), the court found an insufficient
showing of specific knowledge. 2 Nor did the court find evidence of a
material contribution to the infringements.12 3 The court pointed out
that the defendants provided neither a file index nor a central server,
and observed that the defendants wholly lacked the ability to suspend
infringing user accounts. 124 The fact that the designers of the P2P
software might have purposefully designed their products to pass the
Sony test did not factor into the Grokster court's analysis at all.
Rather, in the absence of either specific knowledge or a material
contribution, the court declined to impose contributory liability on
the defendants.

125

While the Ninth Circuit was giving its own reading to the Sony
test in cases such as Napster and Grokster, the Seventh Circuit
stepped into the debate with its opinion in In re Aimster Copyright
Aimster involved a popular file-sharing program
Litigation.126
27
developed by the defendant, a software designer named John Deep.
The program, which operated in part by "piggybacking" on America
Online's Instant Messaging Service, allowed users to connect with one
another and exchange both copyright-protected files (music and film)
as well as non-copyright protected files (e-mails and personal
120. Id. at 1161.
121. Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). This focus on the capability of the software was
exactly the approach defendants' had argued for in their motions to the court. See
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment of Defendants StreamCast Networks, Inc. and MusicCity Networks
Inc. at 3, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., No. 01-08541 SVW (PJWx) (C.D. Cal.
2002).

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Grokster,380 F.3d at 1163.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1157.
334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
Id. at 645.
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photos). 28 The plaintiffs, owners of a large number of copyrightprotected works of music, sued Deep on theories of contributory and
vicarious copyright liability. 129 The evidence before the district court
suggested that the defendant exercised a moderate level of
involvement and control over the program; Aimster maintained its
own server, hosted a website, and provided "how to" tutorials for new
users of the program. 3 0 As a result, the district court found the
defendant liable for contributory and vicarious infringement and
granted a broad injunction against the company.'
On appeal, Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, writing
for the court, immediately acknowledged that the Aimster program
was clearly capable of both infringing and noninfringing uses. 132 As
the court put it, the program could feasibly be used for the
"expeditious exchange of confidential business data among
employees," but it was also clear that copyright-protected works were
also exchanged over the program.'33 As a result, Judge Posner
reasoned that Sony should apply to the facts of the defendants' case
and that the defendants would not be liable if the product were
1' 34
capable of "substantial noninfringing uses.'
From there, Judge Posner commenced a thorough review of the
Sony case as applied to the facts of Aimster. 3 ' The Seventh Circuit
first stated that when faced with a product involving both infringing
and noninfringing uses, an estimate of the "respective magnitudes of
36
the uses is necessary for a finding of contributory infringement."'
Construing Sony this way, the court held that a defendant would not
be able to escape liability for contributory infringement merely by
37
showing that its product could be used in noninfringing ways.
According to Judge Posner, being capable in principle of
128. Id. at 646. "Piggybacking" carries connotations of "riding one's coattails." In
other words, the defendant's software functioned by latching on to a prevalent and
already-popular software program-in this case, the AOL Instant Messenger program. In
addition, the evidence in the case suggests that Deep's program was attaching to a

(supposedly legal) software program for the express purpose of obscuring its infringing
acts.
129. Id. at 645.
130. Id. at 646-47.
131. Id. at 645-46.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 647.
134. Id. at 647-48.
135. Id. at 647-55.
136. Id. at 649.
137. Id. at 651 ("We also do not buy Aimster's argument that ... all Aimster has to
show in order to escape liability for contributory infringement is that its file-sharing
system could be used in non-infringing ways, which arguably it could be.").
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noninfringing uses was insufficient for a defendant to escape liability,
since nearly every product was at least capable of noninfringing
uses. 13 8 Rather, a defendant would have to show that its product was
used for substantialnoninfringing uses.139
To illustrate this point, the court invoked the analogy of a
massage parlor that was actually functioning as an illicit brothel. 4 As
Judge Posner explained, an owner of the massage parlor might claim
that the women he employs are "capable of giving massages," but if
the owner in fact sells "only sex and never massages to [his]
In other
customers, [he] is an aider and abettor of prostitution."''
words, the court made clear that Sony did not support the argument
that the mere capability of noninfringement was enough to escape
contributory liability; the court characterized such an argument as "an
extreme result and one not envisaged by the Sony majority."' 42
Construing Sony as requiring more than just the capability of
noninfringement, then, the Aimster court held that the burden was on
the defendant to show that its service had substantial noninfringing
uses.'4 3 That burden was not met; on the contrary, the court found
that the defendant had presented no evidence of any noninfringing
uses.

144

In addition to the lack of noninfringing uses, the court found a
high level of facilitation by Aimster. 145 The court claimed that
Aimster provided an open invitation for its users to infringe on
It rejected the defendant's
copyrighted-protected material."
argument that it lacked specific knowledge of infringements taking
place on its networks, because it found that the defendant had been
"ostrich-like" with respect to the infringements being committed by
Aimster's users. 147 The court intimated that this willful blindness was
sufficient in terms of the requisite knowledge threshold, providing as
it did "merely another piece of evidence that [the defendant] was a
contributory infringer."'" As a result, the court affirmed the district

138.
139.
uses).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 651-53.
See id. at 648 (emphasizing the proportion of infringing uses to noninfringing
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id.
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court's injunction shutting down the Aimster service on a
contributory liability theory. 49
In reviewing the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Aimster, a few
points are noteworthy. First, the Seventh Circuit clearly construed
Sony as requiring something beyond the possibility of noninfringing
uses, and in that sense, it took an approach completely at odds with
the Ninth Circuit's approach.
The Seventh Circuit placed its
emphasis on the "frequency" of noninfringing uses15° rather than on
the mere capability of such uses, and seemed to suggest that a
significant quantity of noninfringing uses would be needed in order to
qualify as "substantial" under Sony. 5' In some ways, this approach
was redolent of Justice Blackmun's dissent in Sony; after all, it was
Justice Blackmun who had emphasized the "proportion of VTR
'
recording that is infringing." 152

Second, although the Seventh Circuit did not expressly discuss
the two-prong Gershwin test for contributory liability-i.e.,
knowledge and a material contribution-it made clear that the
"knowledge" prong would be satisfied by a showing of willful
blindness or "ostrich-like" behavior. 53 The defendant in Aimster was
deemed to have the requisite knowledge for contributory liability,
despite a paucity of evidence that it had been made aware of specific
instances of infringements occurring on its system.
These P2P cases underscored a severe schism between the Ninth
Circuit and the Seventh Circuit over how to properly interpret
Sony.'5 4 In applying Sony to file-sharing software, the circuits reached
two irreconcilable outcomes,155 with each one emphasizing different
aspects of the Sony doctrine. The Ninth Circuit characterized this
schism as being "premised specifically on a fundamental
disagreement" over the proper reading of Sony.'5 6

149. Id. at 655-56.
150. Id. at 653.
151. Feder, supra note 2, at 898.
152. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 492 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655.
154. Miles, supra note 93, at 21.
155. Id.
156. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1162 n.9 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
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The inter-circuit confusion hinged on two main points. 15 7 First,

the circuits suffered a notable division over the proper interpretation
of Sony's "capable of substantial noninfringing use" test.'5 8

The

Ninth Circuit clearly emphasized the capability of a product for
noninfringing uses. In the Grokster case, for example, the Ninth
Circuit declined to impose liability on the defendants because the
programs involved were at least capable of exchanging public domain

works-this, despite a finding that the "vast majority of the files [on
the networks were] exchanged illegally in violation of copyright
'
law."159

In addition, in Napster, the Ninth Circuit's Sony analysis

focused primarily on the software's current and potential uses, 160 an
approach that is congruent with an emphasis on a product's
capabilities rather than its actual uses.161 The Ninth Circuit's
approach had obvious appeal to P2P software designers, who could
arguably be exonerated from liability by showing only a few token

noninfringing uses.162 As a corollary, the Ninth Circuit's "capability
emphasis" provoked the ire of copyright owners, who argued that the
Ninth Circuit more or less ignored the word "substantial" in its
analysis of whether a product is "capable of substantial noninfringing
use." 163 With respect to the age-old tension between copyright
protection and new technologies-those dueling interests that Sony
had sought to balance-the Ninth Circuit's approach clearly shifted

the scales in favor of the technology interests.
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Sony stood in stark contrast
to the Seventh Circuit's approach in Aimster, which held that the

mere capability of noninfringing uses was not enough to escape
liability and that a high number of noninfringing uses would need to

157. See Axberg, supra note 91, at 435-36 (discussing a number of divisive points
between the circuits, including the proper interpretation of Sony's "capable of substantial
noninfringing use" test and the requisite level of knowledge needed to impose
contributory liability on a software designer).
158. Id.
159. Grokster,380 F.3d at 1160.
160. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001).
161. The Fifth Circuit took a similar view of Sony, placing the emphasis on whether a
product is capable of noninfringement rather than whether those noninfringements are in
fact "substantial." See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 264-67 (5th
Cir. 1988) (applying Sony and holding that a software designer that created a program to
unlock a protection on a computer program was not liable in the presence of a single
noninfringing use).
162. In the case of our hypothetical program, Bookster, for example, our software
designer Eric would not be liable under the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony, since the
works of Mark Twain were exchanged on the network.
163. Feder, supra note 2, at 895.
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According to the Seventh Circuit, Sony demands
be shown."6
"substantial" noninfringing uses, not just any noninfringing use. 165
The Seventh Circuit placed its emphasis on the respective magnitudes
of noninfringing uses to infringing ones.1 66 Unlike the Ninth Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit appeared to shift the legal scales towards the
entertainment industry and those interested in tighter copyright
protection and away from the technology sector. According to the
Seventh Circuit's holding, unless a given technology had a large
number of noninfringing uses, the safe harbor of the Sony doctrine
would be unavailing to the technology's inventors.1 67 Since the vast
majority of popular P2P file sharing programs were being used to
infringe copyrights-with only a small fraction of the file-sharing
taking place on their networks being noninfringing 16 -- the Seventh
Circuit's approach more or less ensured the success of the RIAA and
the demise of the P2P programs that it had been seeking to stamp out.
As a second point, the circuits found themselves split over the
requisite level of knowledge needed to impose contributory liability
on a software designer. The Ninth Circuit construed Sony as
requiring a heightened knowledge standard if a product is capable of
both infringing and noninfringing uses; it expressly stated that under a
Sony analysis a showing of "reasonable knowledge of specific
infringing files" was required.1 69 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
intimated in Aimster that "ostrich-like" behavior on the part of a P2P
software provider was sufficient to meet the knowledge threshold of
The Seventh Circuit's willful blindness
contributory liability."' 0
appeal to copyright holders, who were
more
carried
approach clearly
quick to point out that a requirement of actual knowledge would
encourage P2P designers to "turn a willfully blind eye" to the
7
infringements occurring with their programs."
While the amici briefs were being filed in the Grokster case, and
as the Supreme Court prepared to enter the fray and address the
Sony doctrine in the context of P2P software, the severe schism
164. See Axberg, supra note 91, at 435.
165. Feder, supra note 2, at 895.
166. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540
U.S. 1107 (2004).
167. See id. 647-48.
168. Id. at 653.
169. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2004),
vacated, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
170. Aimster, 334 F.3d at 655.
171. Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1875

(2000).
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between the circuits began having far-reaching ramifications,
stretching well beyond courts of law. Not only did the schism result in
geographically anomalous results, but it also spurred the recording
industry to temporarily abandon its strategy of enjoining P2P systems
in favor of pursuing individual lawsuits against those who
downloaded copyright-protected music. 172 Immediately following the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Grokster, for example, the RIAA brought
750 lawsuits against individual users of Grokster and other P2P
programs, seeking to impose direct, rather than contributory,
copyright liability. 173 Such an approach proved to be not only
expensive and time-consuming from the perspective of the RIAA, 7
but it also had the reverse effect of demonizing the RIAA and the
172. See Axberg, supra note 91, at 390 (stating that the new strategy of suing
individuals followed the RIAA's unsuccessful lawsuit against Grokster).
173. See Bill Holland, RIAA Files 750 Infringement Suits, BILLBOARD.COM, Oct. 29,
2004, available at http://www.billboard.com/bb/daily/article.display.jsp?vnu-contentid
=1000694363. In the wake of its defeat in Grokster at the appellate level, the RIAA
undertook a vast range of legally creative tactics. For example, after the Grokster decision
was announced by the Ninth Circuit, the RIAA sued Sharman Networks and other
companies involved with the P2P program Kazaa in a court in Sydney, Australia, in the
hope that Australia's courts might be more amenable to a finding of contributory
copyright liability than the Ninth Circuit. See Susan Butler, Labels, Kazaa Battle in
Australian Court, BILLBOARD.COM, Nov. 30, 2004, availableat http://www.billboard.com/
bb/daily/article.display.jsp?vnucontent id=1000728021#loop.
This litigation strategy
wound up proving fruitful for the RIAA; in September 2005 the federal Australian court
in Sydney ruled that Kazaa's software had clearly infringed a number of music copyrights.
See Wayne Arnold, Australian Court Rules Kazaa Has Violated Copyrights, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2005, at C3. In an opinion by Judge Murray R. Wilcox, the court ordered Kazaa to
alter its software to completely prevent violations by its users. Id. At the same time,
Judge Wilcox acknowledged that this would be more or less impossible for Kazaa to do.
Id. The ruling appears to confirm the death of Kazaa as a viable P2P technology, at least
in the context of Australian copyright law.
The RIAA also filed individual lawsuits against media companies who offer
financial assistance to P2P software endeavors. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann
AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 412-13 (C.D. Cal. 2004). In that proceeding, the RIAA filed suit
against Bertelsmann, the media conglomerate that purchased P2P program Napster as its
bankruptcy was impending in 2001. The plaintiffs argued that by funding Napster as
copyright infringements were continuing to occur on its system, Bertelsmann was liable for
contributory copyright infringement. Id. at 410. The district court allowed the copyright
infringement claims against Bertelsmann to proceed.
However, the court showed
ambivalence over issuing a blanket holding that anyone involved in the capitalization of a
P2P software company could be liable for contributory liability; the court explained: "at
this stage the court need not pass upon the question of whether mere financial support of a
contributing and vicarious infringer such as Napster-without more direct involvementwould give rise to a claim for contributory or vicarious infringement against the party
providing the funding." Id. at 414.
174. See, e.g., Glenn Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private
Copying, and the DigitalMillenium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 849 (2001) (stating
that "even if [individual users can be identified] in some cases, the costs of resolving the
question of infringement through a judicial proceeding are prohibitive").

2006]

CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT LIABILITY

copyright holders they represented, rather than fomenting public
sympathy for them.'75
The individual lawsuit approach also proved to be an ineffective
means of dealing with the proliferation of P2P software, or what one
76
commentator called a "teaspoon solution to an ocean problem.'
As the RIAA continued to launch individual lawsuits against the
users of P2P software, the technologies for file-sharing continued to
advance to further protect and hide illegal use. 17 7 In other words, "the
extremes of one side invited a more extreme response by the
other."'7 8 Studies showed that users of P2P software evidently had no
problem abandoning their current P2P application for newer, more
elusive platforms. 79 In fact, P2P users began consistently migrating to
the newest and most advanced programs, "whether [they] respected
copyrights or not."'180 Meanwhile, in the absence of a uniform legal
approach, the stalemate between P2P users and copyright holders
worsened, with each side claiming that it was in the right.'8 '
The United States Supreme Court's decision to inject itself into
this debate, by granting certiorari in the Grokster case in late 2004,82
created a prime opportunity for the Court to resolve the impasse
between copyright owners and P2P software designers. Indeed, the
severe inter-circuit schism seemed to militate dramatically for a revisitation of the Sony doctrine as applied to file-sharing software.
Many hoped that when the Court stepped into the legal debate, the
P2P impasse, as well as the injustices it had produced for both

175. See, e.g., Tom Zeller, Jr., As Piracy Battle Nears Supreme Court, the Messages
Grow Manic, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at C1 (describing recent efforts by the RIAA to
educate the public about the harms of unauthorized downloading, but stating that the
individual suits have "made it difficult for copyright holders to foster a positive public

image--even though they see the lawsuits as critical to stamping out theft").
176. Randal Picker, Copyright as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47
ANTITRUST BULL. 423,442 (2002).
177. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 85, at 731 (describing how a number of P2Ps such as

Gnutella, Kazaa, and Grokster attempted to modify their programs in "an intentional
effort.., to avoid a lawsuit").
178. LESSIG, supra note 97, at 200.

179. Roemer, supra note 80, at 8-9.
180. Id.

181. Both sides of the stalemate also sought to rally public opinion in anticipation of
the Supreme Court's decision. See Zeller, supra note 175 (describing how each side
pursued vigorous advertising and public awareness campaigns about the pros and cons of
P2P software).
182. See Greenhouse & Manly, supra note 24.
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copyright owners and individual consumers, 183 would be resolved

once and for all.
III. THE SUPREME COURT ENTERS THE FRAY: GROKSTER

When the Supreme Court opted to enter the P2P debate in the
Grokster case in 2004, it found itself faced with the same fundamental
problem that had beset the Sony Court twenty years earlier: how to
strike a proper balance "between the interests of authors and

inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and
discoveries ... and ...the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce."'"
The stakes in Grokster were quite high; the Court
ideally needed to find a way to limit widespread and rampant
copyright infringement while at the same time permitting the public
to enjoy the myriad benefits of P2P technologies.'85

183. The RIAA argued that CD sales fell by 8.9%, and revenues fell by 6.7%, as a
result of P2P file sharing. LESSIG, supra note 97, at 70. The validity of these figures has
been hotly debated over the years, and the Grokster case unfortunately did precious little
to resolve the issue. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2794 (2005)
(Breyer, J.,concurring) (noting the debate over the impact of P2P on record sales).
Regardless of their validity, however, on the other side of the industry's reduced revenues
are a number of injustices that resulted from the RIAA's strategy of pursuing individual
lawsuits for infringements rather than contributory ones. The RIAA's lawsuits included,
among others, a suit against a twelve year-old girl living in public housing and a suit
against a seventy year-old man "who had no idea what file sharing was." LESSIG, supra
note 97, at 200.
184. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
185. The potential benefits of P2P have been well documented. See, e.g., Benkler,
supra note 81, at 381-82 (describing a P2P program by which a number of NASA
"clickworkers" independently review NASA's satellite photographs and work to
collaboratively produce a detailed map); Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 6 (Magazine), at 44 (claiming that P2P offers the benefit of a
"collaborative model for producing and sharing ideas"). In fact, StreamCast, one of the
defendants in Grokster, made clear in the months leading up to the Grokster opinion that
P2P had the potential to provide numerous benefits to the information-consuming public.
In one interview, company CEO Michael Weiss posited that the "potential uses" for P2P
were "staggering, assisting those who wish to trade anything from white papers and
nursery rhymes to breaking news." See The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television
broadcast Mar. 7, 2005), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/media/jan-june05/
download_3-07.html. As Weiss put it: "There are 60 million users of peer-to-peer software
in America alone, and 100 million worldwide. The amount of information storage that are
on those computers of over 100 million users dwarfs anything that's available on the
Web." Id. Legal scholars have also argued that a severe approach to P2P by the courts
could deprive the public of the substantial benefits that the technology offers. See, e.g.,
LESSIG, supra note 97, at 74 (stating a "zero tolerance" approach to P2P "would mean that
we as a society must lose the benefits of P2P, even for the totally legal and beneficial uses
that they serve, simply to assure that there are zero copyright infringements that are
caused by P2P").
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The Grokster opinion, announced on the last day before the
Court's 2005 summer recess, was a unanimous one. 86 From a
procedural standpoint, the Court made clear its view that the district
court had plainly erred in granting summary judgment to the
defendants on the issue of contributory copyright liability and that the
Ninth Circuit had erred in affirming that decision. 87 Beyond the
procedural unanimity of the Grokster opinion, however, lurked some
notable distinctions on such issues as the Sony doctrine, the particular
facts of the case, and the ultimate basis for the imposition of
infringement liability. Justice Souter wrote the Court's opinion in
Grokster, but Justices Ginsburg and Breyer each wrote separate
concurrences, which a total of six Justices joined.
Justice Souter's opinion commenced its analysis with a
recognition of the benefits of P2P technology.' 88 The opinion also
noted the fundamental importance of achieving "a sound balance
between the respective values of supporting creative pursuits through
new
innovation in
promoting
protection and
copyright
communication technologies by limiting the incidence of liability for
copyright infringements."'1 9 Despite the need for a wise balance in
crafting the scope of copyright liability, however, Justice Souter's
opinion made clear that the conduct of the defendants Grokster and
StreamCast in the case at hand militated strongly in favor of imposing
liability. 9° Indeed, in light of evidence that the defendants' "principal
object" 19 ' was to infringe on copyrights via their P2P platforms, as
well as evidence that the infringement of copyright was central to the
defendants' business model, the Court concluded that copyright
liability was entirely appropriate." 9
This conclusion prompted the Court to articulate its so-called
inducement theory193 of contributory copyright liability; as the Court
explained: "one who distributes a [technological] device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is

186. Linda Greenhouse & Lorne Manly, Justices Reinstate Suits on Internet File
Sharing,N.Y. TIMES, June 28,2005, at C1.
187. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005).
188. Id. at 2770 (citing the benefits of "security, cost, and efficiency" with P2P
platforms).
189. Id. at 2775.
190. Id. at 2776.
191. Id. at 2774.
192. Id. at 2782.
193. Id. at 2776 n.9, 2780.
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liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties., 19 4 In
light of evidence in the record that the defendants had advertised
their product as being used to infringe copyrights, 195 the defendants
had taken no steps to filter from their networks those copyrightprotected works, 196 and the defendants had repeatedly sought to be
'
the "next Napster,"'197 the Court found an express "objective"198
to
infringe and concluded that contributory liability was wholly
appropriate. Justice Souter's opinion made clear that where there
was "purposeful, culpable expression and conduct" on the part of a
defendant programmer or distributor, or where there was extensive
evidence of "advertisement or solicitation that broadcasts a message
designed to stimulate others to commit violations,"' 199 contributory
copyright liability would lie.
Because Grokster was the first Supreme Court case to construe
contributory copyright liability since Sony, the Court had little choice
but to address the Sony doctrine and its continuing relevance to the
field of copyright law. Turning to Sony, Justice Souter's opinion first
stated that the "staple article of commerce doctrine" of patent lawon which the Sony test had been based-was actually a two-fold legal
concept: while the inventor of a product with "substantial lawful as
well as unlawful uses" could be exonerated from liability, the designer
of a product "where the article is 'good for nothing else but
infringement' " could and should be held liable.2"° Justice Souter then
articulated the Court's view that the Ninth Circuit had misapplied
Sony by giving the case far too broad a reading.2"' While Justice
Souter's opinion intimated that Sony remains good law, the opinion
suggested that the Sony doctrine should not be used to exonerate an
inventor or distributor from liability where an infringing intent was
manifest:
[T]his case is significantly different from Sony and reliance on
that case to rule in favor of [the defendants] was error. Sony
dealt with a claim of liability based solely on distributing a
product with alternative lawful and unlawful uses, with

194. Id. at 2770, 2780.
195. Id. at 2780-81.
196. Id. at 2781.
197. Id. at 2773.
198. Id. at 2781.
199. Id. at 2780.
200. Id. at 2777-78 (citations omitted); see also id. at 2779 n.10 (stating that the staple
article doctrine provides no exemption for those who induce infringement).
201. Id. at 2778-79 (stating that the Ninth Circuit's reading of Sony was "erroneous").
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knowledge that some users would follow the unlawful
course. ... MGM's evidence in this case most obviously
addresses a different basis of liability for distributing a product
open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the distributor's
words and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a
purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of copyright
infringement. If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately
found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault,
but from inferring a patently illegal objective from statements
and actions showing what that objective was. 02
In other words, the Court affirmed the overall validity of Sony,
while stating that the Grokster case was distinguishable from Sony in
light of evidence of "affirmative steps "23 on the part of the
defendants to infringe copyright. Justice Souter's Grokster opinion
declined the parties' invitation to "revisit Sony further, ' '2° either to
clarify it or to address exactly how the Ninth Circuit had
misconstrued it.20 Rather, Justice Souter summarily stated that it was

202. Id. at 2782.
203. Id. at 2780.
204. Id. at 2778.
205. The Court did not address exactly how the Ninth Circuit had misconstrued Sony,
nor did it address whether a court reviewing contributory liability should focus on the
"substantiality" of a product's noninfringing uses rather than solely on its "capabilities."
Of course, one can speculate that the Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision to
ignore the word "substantial" in its analysis of whether a product is "capable of substantial
noninfringing use," see Feder, supra note 2, at 895, and that perhaps the Court found itself
in agreement with the strict approach articulated by the Seventh Circuit in Aimster, which
analyzed the proportion of infringing uses to noninfringing uses, In re Aimster Copyright
Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1107 (2004).
In fact, some commentators have argued that the Court, by first denying certiorari
to the Seventh Circuit in Aimster in 2004, implicitly suggested that it was endorsing that
Circuit's legal reasoning. See, e.g., Francavillo, supra note 31, at 868 (characterizing the
Seventh Circuit's approach as "a more practical reading of Sony"); Wu, supra note 85, at
739 (stating that "the ratio of infringing to non-infringing use" should be at "the forefront
of the ultimate policy judgment in this area"). The temptation to read Grokster as an
affirmation of the Seventh Circuit's approach is arguably bolstered by the Grokster
Court's statement that the vast majority of the works exchanged on the defendants'
networks were infringing works, Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2770-71, as well as its observation
that liability was clearly appropriate "given the number of infringing downloads that
occur[ed] every day" using the defendants' products. Id. at 2776. The Grokster Court also
seemed to adhere to the Seventh Circuit's emphasis on a defendant's behavior in assessing
infringement liability. Compare Aimster, 334 F.3d at 651 imposing liability where there
was a high level of facilitation of copyright infringement), with Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2782
(basing defendants' liability on their "purpose to cause ... third-party acts of copyright
infringement").
Despite these similarities, however, because the Court failed to explain exactly
how the Ninth Circuit misconstrued Sony, the argument that the Seventh Circuit got it
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sufficient for purposes of the Groksteropinion "to note that the Ninth
Circuit's judgment rested on an erroneous understanding of Sony."2 °6
The Court left "further consideration of the Sony rule" for another
day.

20 7

In analyzing Justice Souter's opinion in Grokster, a few points

are noteworthy. First, the "inducement theory" Justice Souter
articulated may have first been raised during oral arguments in the
Grokster case,
but the theory arguably has its roots in Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Sony. After all, it was Justice Blackmun who
had argued in Sony that if a given manufacturer were "purposefully
profiting" from a given infringement, "liability [would be]
appropriately imposed. 2 °9 By placing the emphasis on a software

distributor's intent, it can be argued that the Court in Grokster was
merely moving closer to the approach taken in Justice Blackmun's
Sony dissent.

Second, despite its seeming legal clarity, the Court's "inducement
theory" is not without flaws. Such an approach inevitably involves a
factual inquiry into the intent or purpose of a software
designer/distributor, which remains highly subjective. Nor is the
intent of a particular software designer always easy to ascertain; many
computer programmers might create a P2P program without any real
"purpose" or "object," commercial or otherwise, beyond an interest

right in Aimster remains very much a speculative one. In fact, although Justice Souter
made clear that the Court was reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Grokster majority never
explicitly endorsed the Seventh Circuit's stricter approach.
206. Grokster,125 S. Ct. at 2778-79.
207. Id.
208. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125
S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480), available at http://p2p.weblogsinc.com/entry/123400016
7039288.
209. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 491 (1984)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); cf Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2782 (basing the
liability of defendants on their "purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of
copyright infringement").
Commentators had expressly endorsed an inducement
approach to copyright liability in anticipation of the Grokster case. See, e.g., Lee Gomes,
Editorial, Ethical Responsibility,At Issue With Grokster,Applies to Others, Too, WALL ST.
J., June 27, 2005, at B1 ("Grokster ... was in reality specifically designed for an illegal
activity. While some people may use it for legal purposes (though I have never met
anyone who has), its overwhelming use is to commit a crime."). In fact, one copyright
scholar, calling his variation of the inducement analysis the "commercial punch" test,
endorsed something similar to the inducement theory years before the Grokster opinion.
That commentator argued that "courts should examine the underlying business that
supports the development and distribution of the software," and argued that if copyright
infringements were fundamentally "necessary to sustain [a company's] business model,
however, the software [would not be] capable of substantial noninfringing use as
contemplated in Sony." See Feder, supra note 2, at 901.
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in seeing if the program will function properly.
Would such
programmers be liable on a contributory liability theory based on the
ratio of infringements to noninfringements, or would the absence of
any express "intent" exonerate them from third-party liability? The
answer is far from clear.
To be sure, the Court's inducement theory arguably raises as
many questions as it resolves.210 For example, is such a theory
intended to now supplement the already-familiar Sony doctrine,
simply by incorporating into it considerations of intent and purpose?
That certainly seems to be one possible reading that could be given to
Justice Souter's opinion.2 1' Alternatively, should a lower court now
completely forgo the "capable of substantial noninfringing uses"
analysis where the evidentiary record is replete with references to
"affirmative steps" taken to infringe?2"' These legal questions will
persist in the wake of the Court's opinion in Grokster, and will likely
only be clarified as the lower courts begin implementing the opinion
into their copyright liability cases in the years to come.
In addition to Justice Souter's opinion, Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer each wrote separate concurrences in Grokster. Justice
Ginsburg's concurrence first agreed that "the Ninth Circuit went
astray" in its reading of Sony." 3 Her argument, however, for
reversing the Ninth Circuit-and the lower court-was much more of
a procedural one. Essentially, Ginsburg argued that a "genuine issue
of material fact" on the noninfringing activities of the defendants
remained, and so summary judgment in favor of the defendants had
been wholly inappropriate. 14 In reviewing the evidentiary record,
Justice Ginsburg felt that the evidence submitted by the defendants
210. See Zeller, supra note 13 (stating that Grokster provides "little guidance on just
how one might determine whether a company was purposefully inducing its users to
violate the law"); see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Editorial, Remote Control, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Sept. 2005, at 37, 37-38 (arguing that the Supreme Court has increasingly "lost
touch with the real world ramifications of its decisions" and positing that "lower court
judges often find the law difficult to ascertain today," despite knowing "what each justice
thinks it ought to be").
211. See Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2779 (stating that while Sony called for an examination
of a product's uses, a court should not "ignore evidence of intent [to infringe] if there is
such evidence"); id. (stating that Sony "did not displace other theories of secondary
liability"); see also id. at 2794 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the importance of
preserving the Sony analysis, while agreeing with the premise that in cases of a "specific
intent to infringe" contributory liability is appropriate).
212. See, e.g., id. at 2779 (majority opinion) (stating that "where evidence goes beyond
a product's characteristics ... and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
infringement, Sony's staple-article rule will not preclude liability").
213. Id. at 2784 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2784-86.
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on the issue of their products' "noninfringing uses" was largely
unsubstantiated and anecdotal.215 She also argued that the evidence
submitted by the defendants-a number of affidavits speaking to the
legal, noninfringing uses of their product-were inconsistent and
impossible to quantify. 216 Her opinion made clear that the plaintiffs
had submitted overwhelming evidence of copyright infringements on
the defendants' systems, and the piecemeal affidavits submitted by
the defendants had plainly failed to rebut the plaintiffs' evidence.217
In light of that fact, Justice Ginsburg made clear her view that,
procedurally, the district court never should have granted summary
judgment to the defendants in the first place.
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence prompted a separate opinion
from Justice Breyer, who interpreted her opinion as endorsing a
much higher evidentiary threshold than Sony required. According to
Justice Breyer, Justice Ginsburg was incorrect to require
overwhelming evidence of noninfringing uses; Justice Breyer felt that,
given his more liberal reading of Sony, the defendants had clearly met
the "capable of substantial ...noninfringing uses" threshold.2 18 He
expressed concern that Ginsburg would require that a large number
of noninfringing uses be shown before summary judgment could ever
be granted in favor of a software designer/defendant.2 9 As Justice
Breyer read Sony, a showing of a mere ten percent noninfringing uses
on a software system would meet the Sony threshold and would
support a grant of summary judgment in favor of a defendant.22
Justice Breyer's opinion subtly criticized the Seventh Circuit's more
restrictive reading of Sony, and pointed out that the Sony opinion's
use of the word "capable" imposed a liberal breadth on the Sony
doctrine.221 His statement that courts applying Sony should consider
the "prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time '222 placed his
opinion much closer to the Ninth Circuit (which emphasized the word
"capable" in the "noninfringing use" analysis) and much further from

215. Id. at 2785.
216. Id. at 2785-86
217. Id. at 2785, 2786 n.3.
218. Id. at 2790 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also id. at 2788 (stating that "Grokster
passes Sony's test").
219. Id. at 2790-91.
220. Id. at 2789 ("That leaves some number of files near 10% that apparently are
noninfringing, a figure very similar to the 9% or so of authorized time-shifting uses of the
VCR that the Court faced in Sony.").
221. Id. at 2790.
222. Id. at 2789.
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the Seventh Circuit (which emphasized the word "substantial" in the
"noninfringing use" analysis).
And yet, despite Justice Breyer's liberal approach-and despite
his finding that Sony's "capable of noninfringing uses" standard had
been plainly satisfied in the case of defendants Grokster and
StreamCast-his opinion went on to agree with the general premise
that it was appropriate to impose liability on the defendants. As
Justice Breyer himself explained, despite the fact that the Sony test
had been met, "a copyright holder may proceed against a technology
223
provider where a provable specific intent to infringe ... is present.
In other words, Justice Breyer's concurrence confirmed the view that
liability may be imposed on a defendant, notwithstanding satisfaction
of the Sony threshold, in the presence of a specific intent to infringe a
copyright.
Justice Breyer's concurrence was rather notably joined by
Justices Stevens and O'Connor, who had been the key votes in the
Sony majority; it was Justice Stevens who wrote the Sony opinion,
and Justice O'Connor who first proposed the "capable of substantial
noninfringing uses" test.224 Not surprisingly, therefore, the concurring
Justices engaged in a thorough review of the Sony doctrine,225 only to
conclude that the doctrine still provided the best possible balance
between copyright owners' rights and technological innovation.226
The concurrence concluded that the Sony test remained ideal for
cases of contributory liability, and made clear that "a strong
demonstrated need for modifying Sony (or for interpreting Sony's
standard more strictly) has not yet been shown. "227
While Justice Souter's opinion did not as wholeheartedly endorse
Sony, neither did it seek to overturn it or amend it. As Justice
22
Souter's opinion put it, the Court refused to "revisit Sony further. 1
Rather, the Court stated it would "leave further consideration of the
Sony rule for a day when that may be required. '229 Justice Souter's
holding made clear that the Sony test remains good law. In other

223. Id. at 2794 (commenting on the opinion of the majority at page 2782); see also id.

at 2778 (majority opinion) (stating that Sony does not "displace other theories of
secondary liability").
224. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
225. See Grokster,125 S. Ct. at 2791-96 (Breyer, J., concurring).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 2796.
228. Id. at 2778-79 (majority opinion).
229. Id.
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23 ° Reports of the doctrine's death
words, Sony survived Grokster.
had, in fact, been greatly exaggerated.

IV. THE IMPACT OF GROKSTER AND How CONGRESS COULD
RESPOND

What will be the impact of Grokster? In the wake of the Court's
opinion, media outlets described the holding as a "major victory" for
entertainment companies and copyright holders.2 3 t It is certainly
tempting to read Grokster as a ringing endorsement of liability for
each and every P2P designed with the goal of accessing copyrightprotected works.232 And yet the Court's holding in Grokster may
prove to be a Pyrrhic victory for the entertainment industry and the
copyright holders that they represent. In fact, the entertainment
industry will likely still face "a long, slow grind in influencing
consumers to alter their habits. '233 Studies have shown that an

230. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
231. Greenhouse & Manly, supra note 186. The article quoted industry executives
hailing the decision as "good news indeed." Id.- But see Electric Frontier Foundation,
Deep Links, Noteworthy News from Around the Internet, Grokster Reader's Guide, para.
2 (June 25, 2005), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/archives/003742.php (posting of Fred von
Lohmann, Attorney for Defendants) [hereinafter Lohmann] ("No matter what, we've
won. From the beginning of this lawsuit the entertainment industries pushed the lower
courts to adopt extreme, outlandish interpretations of copyright law .... No matter what
the Court will announce on Monday, it will not be adopting [an] extreme position. So
remember what we've already won.").
232. See Timothy L. O'Brien, King Kong vs. The Pirates of the Multiplex, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, § 3, at 1. The article discusses the recent proliferation of pirated, bigbudget films-via P2P software-and Hollywood's attempts to stamp out such piracy. Id.
However, the article notes that the Grokster opinion clearly "affirmed legal protections
for creative content distributed online," and indicates that "[t]he ruling will make it easier
for Hollywood to litigate more aggressively, should it choose to do so." Id.
However, despite the bolstering language of the Grokster opinion, the
entertainment industry apparently remains amenable to suing individual P2P users.
Armed with the Grokster opinion as a form of additional ammunition, in September 2005
the RIAA filed another 757 lawsuits against individual users of P2P file-sharing programs,
sixty-four of whom were college students. See Latest Round of Music Industry Lawsuits
Targets Internet Theft at 17 College Campuses, COLLEGIATE PRESSWIRE, Sept. 28, 2005,
http://www.cpwire.com/artmon/publish/printer-1158.asp. This brought the total number
of individual lawsuits filed by the RIAA to 14,800. Id.
233. Jeff Leeds, No Pot of Gold in Court Ruling for the Studios, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
2005, at Cl; Hilary Rosen, Editorial, The Supreme Wisdom of Not Relying on the Court,
HUFFINGTON POST, June 26, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hilary-rosen/the(stating, in an editorial by the former
supreme-wisdom-of-not b_3221.html
Chairman/CEO of the RIAA, that "while the victory of whoever wins may be important
psychologically, it just won't really matter in the marketplace"); see also Roemer, supra
note 80, at 9 (stating that P2P users will "migrate to the best P2P system, whether it
respects copyrights or not").
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estimated ten million Americans use P2P file-sharing software234with an estimated six million logged on to P2P networks at any one
time. 235 As Fred Von Lohmann, the lawyer for the defendants in
Grokster, explained on the eve of the Court's opinion, the Grokster
case is not likely to destroy P2P software: "There's too much demand
and too many smart startups ... who can find ways to play within the
system. If that fails, there are companies overseas to pick up the
cause."2 36 Accordingly, the Grokster opinion might prove to be less
effective than the entertainment industry might have hoped.
In fact, those involved in software development and the
technology sector might be encouraged by certain aspects of the
Court's holding in Grokster. The opinion made clear that it would
not serve to discourage those technology companies involved in
"legitimate commerce" or "innovation having a lawful promise. "237
The opinion also rejected the notion that, "in the absence of other
evidence of intent," a court could impose liability "based on a failure
to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device
otherwise was capable of substantial non-infringing uses. "238 Such a
restrictive approach to copyright liability, the Court concluded, would
' 239
"tread too close to the Sony safe harbor."
It is not immediately clear whether the Grokster holding will
have a detrimental effect on P2P technologies. At a minimum, the
opinion will arguably permit P2Ps to continue to exist in certain
technological contexts. While those P2Ps designed with the express
2 40
purpose of encouraging the free exchange of copyrighted works
may now be shut down, it is possible that other P2Ps, such as
collaborative learning programs24 1 and noncommercial P2Ps like
Project Gutenberg, will be permitted to thrive in the twenty-first
234. Renee Graham, Some Doubt Ruling Will Stop Downloading, BOSTON GLOBE,

June 28, 2005, at A4.
235. Leeds, supra note 233; see also David Pogue, Britney to Rent, Lease or Buy, N.Y.

TIMES, Aug. 7, 2005, § 2, at 1 (stating that the growth of legal 'pay-per-download' services
such as iTunes has only "infinitesimally" affected the proliferation of free P2P file-sharing
programs, and claiming that "despite all of Apple's success selling songs online ... nearly
10 times as much online music is swapped as is bought").
236. Sarah Lacy, Countdown to Grokster vs. MGM [sic], Bus. WEEK ONLINE, June 23,

2005, http://www.businessweek.com.
237. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780 (2005).
238. Id. at 2781 n.12.
239. Id.
240. See, e.g., Alec Klein, Going Napster One Better; Aimster Says Its File Sharing
Software Skirts Legal Quagmire, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at Al (describing how the

P2P Aimster software was designed to be the "next Napster" and how it had the express
goal of allowing free downloads of copyrighted work without incurring legal liability).
241. Benkler, supra note 81, at 381-82.
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century. Some have also argued that the "inducement" approach of
Grokster may create a healthy incentive for P2P designers to create
noninfringing products,242 since those P2Ps designed to profit solely
from infringing uses will now be held liable.
And yet, despite the ongoing commentary over the Grokster
decision and its likely impact on the field of technological innovation,
it is quite possible that Congress, rather than the Court, will be the
governmental body to step in and address the proper coexistence
between copyright law and P2P technologies.
The notion that Congress should participate in shaping the scope
of copyright liability is nothing new. It was, after all, the Sony
opinion in which the Supreme Court articulated the view that
"[s]ound policy ... supports our consistent deference to Congress
when major technological innovations alter the market for
copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and
the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations
of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
'
More recently, in upholding the constitutionality of
technology."243
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,2" the Supreme
Court made clear its view that it should always "defer substantially to
Congress" with respect to copyright matters.245 After all, as the Court
is wont to point out, Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution
states that "Congress shall have the power" to prescribe the scope of
copyright law in order to secure "for246limited Times ... to authors'
exclusive Right to their... Writings.
The Groksteropinion also hinted at the involvement of Congress
in the P2P debate. Justice Souter, for example, suggested that the
struggle to find a proper balance "may247well draw the public directly
into the debate over copyright policy.
Justice Breyer more explicitly stated that "the legislative option
remains available. Courts are less well suited than Congress to the

242. Feder, supra note 2, at 905.
243. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984); see
also White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 18 (1909) (stating that
copyright protection considerations "properly address themselves to the legislative and
not to the judicial branch of the Government"); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d
871, 876 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled in part, Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 125 S. Ct. 2688 (2005) ("Like Heraclitus at the river, we address the
Internet aware that courts are ill-suited to fix its flow.").
244. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
245. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003).

246. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
247. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775 (2005).
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task of 'accommodating fully the varied permutations of competing
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.' ,,248
Thus, in the wake of the Grokster holding, many were predicting
inevitable congressional involvement in the P2P debate.249
The "congressional involvement" approach has both strengths
and weaknesses. One side of the argument is that, over and above
the obvious constitutional mandate of Article I, Section 8, Congress
tends to be more balanced when it comes to crafting copyright laws.
Congress's laws are typically the result of compromises with various
interest groups-software designers and copyright holders alike.
Moreover, Congress has the ability to fine tune remedies so that the
effects of infringement liability are not too burdensome on anyone.
Judicial decisions, on the other hand, are much more likely to be "all
or nothing. '250 It can also be argued that Congress is best poised to
step into the fray when the market alone is incapable of solving an
infringement problem-a market failure.2 5' In such instances, when
flaws within the market "preclude achievement of desirable
consensual exchanges ....
Congress may correct for market
distortions by imposing a regulatory solution.2 15 2 In other words,
proponents of congressional action argue that not only is Congress
best poised to balance competing interests, but also that congressional
action is most sorely needed when the market alone has been unable
to address the failures between content owners and software
developers.
On the other side of that argument, however, is the criticism that
any copyright-P2P statute emanating from Congress will be the result
of special interest lobbying and that any such statute will inevitably
tilt in favor of copyright owners and against lesser-funded software
developers. The intense private lobbying that preceded the passage
of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act in 1998 is
illustrative of this problem:
Ten of the thirteen original sponsors of the act in the House
received the maximum contribution from Disney's political
248. Id. at 2796 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 431).

249. See Lohmann, supra note 231 ("The Court's opinion will set the stage for the
inevitable fight on Capitol Hill.").
250. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 146. But see Feder, supra note 2, at 908
(arguing that congressional deference is wholly inappropriate and that it should be the
sole duty of the judiciary to apply statutory principles to new technologies as they

proliferate).
251. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1615 (1982).
252. Id. at 1613.
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action committee; in the Senate, eight of the twelve sponsors
received contributions.
The RIAA and the MPAA are
estimated to have spent over $1.5 million lobbying in the 1998
election cycle. They paid out more than $200,000 in campaign
contributions. Disney is estimated to have contributed more
than $800,000 to reelection campaigns in the 1998 cycle.253
Critics of the congressional approach, such as Professor
Lawrence Lessig, argue that a P2P statute will fail to achieve the
proper balance between copyright law and new technologies-a
balance that the majority in Sony sought to strike.25 4 According to
this argument, it is the judiciary, not Congress, which is in the best
position to strike a balance between copyright protection and P2P
software; after all, the judiciary is much more insulated from private
lobbying and monetary contributions from interested parties.
Assuming that the P2P battle shifts to Congress, what types of
legislative solutions might Congress propose? Unfortunately, those
which have been suggested in recent years fail to strike a reasonable
balance between copyright law and P2P users. Take, for example, the
much-discussed Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act (H.R. 5211),
which was proposed by Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal.) in
late 2002.255 Berman's bill includes a self-help provision that allows a
copyright holder to use technology to deter or prevent the
unauthorized distribution of copyrighted works over the Internet.
The bill grants copyright holders the right to use any technology at
their disposal to disable, interfere, or block the distribution of
copyrighted works, and it limits liability for the impairment of
personal computers,256 as long as the economic loss suffered by the
user is less than fifty dollars. 257 Representative Berman, whose
constituency is Hollywood, has publicly defended the self-help

253. LESSIG, supra note 97, at 218; see also Lunney, supra note 174, at 897-98 (noting
the danger of special interest laws because of the disproportionate influence of the RIAA
and the MPAA in Washington, D.C.).
254. See LESSIG, supra note 97, at 215-16, 221-25.
255. Peer-to-Peer Piracy Prevention Act of 2002, H.R. 5211, 107th Cong. (2002). The
bill failed to move out of a House subcommittee during the 107th Congress. If the public
looks to Congress to address the P2P issue in the wake of Grokster, Berman's bill will be a
likely contender, as it is already drafted and ready for House consideration.
256. Id. § 514(a).
257. Id. § 514(b)(1)(c).
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allowed property
aspects of his bill, arguing that "the law has long
258
property.
their
protect
to]
steps
[take
to
owners
The Berman bill would clearly have the effect of stifling P2P use,
because if a P2P network dealt (intentionally or not) in the exchange
of copyright-protected works, the user of that network would run the
risk that his computer could be accessed and disabled by the
copyright owners. Most P2P users would not want to take that riskeven if the destruction to their hard drive would be limited to fifty
dollars in repairs-and would therefore cease from using P2P
technology at all. To revert to our Bookster hypothetical, since
Stephen King was exchanged over Eric's network, any user of
Bookster would run up against the risk that his or her hard drive
could be damaged by continuing to use the network. Most users
would not want to take that risk, and the Bookster network would
effectively be shut down, even though the exchanges of the works of
Mark Twain pose no threat to copyright owners. Moreover, the
above description of the Berman bill assumes that the copyright
owners who benefit from the bill will adhere to the bill's provisions
and limit hard drive damage to fifty dollars-an assumption that is
not at all guaranteed. 9
If Representative Berman's bill fails to strike the proper balance
described by the Sony Court, another bill, like the one proposed by
now-retired Senator Fritz Hollings (D-S.C.) fares little better.2 60
Hollings's bill mandates copyright protection technologies in all
digital media devices. Under the bill, the private sector would
negotiate for the adoption of mandatory security system standards
and encoding rules under the supervision of the Federal
Communications Commission.261 Once the standards were adopted,
the bill would make it illegal to "sell, offer for sale in interstate
commerce ...digital media devices unless the device includes and
utilizes standard security technologies that adhered to the security
system standards" adopted under the bill.262 Although Hollings's bill

258. Jennifer Norman, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive Peer-toPeer?, 26 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 371, 399 (2003) (citing Dawn C. Chmielewski, 'Self-Help'
Anti-Piracy Bill Unveiled, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 26, 2002, at 1C).
259. Indeed, Berman's bill has no mechanism to ensure that self-helping copyright
owners limit their hard drive damage to fifty dollars; Berman appears to trust that they
will do so. See Norman, supra note 258, at 400 (claiming that under Berman's bill there is
"too great a potential for abuse").
260. Consumer Broadband and Digital Television Promotion Act, S. 2048, 107th Cong.

(2002).
261. Id. § 3.
262. Id. § 5(a).
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envisions the security standards as emanating from a panel of content
owners, technology companies, and consumer advocates, the bill's
broad language-applying to any "digital media device"-could
arguably bar many fair use applications of existing technologies, such
as digital video recording ("DVR") or digital audio tape ("DAT")
duplications. While the bill contains a vague reference to "fair use"
in general, it does not make additional fair use allowances.2 63 In
addition, Hollings's bill fails to strike a balance in the sense that it
places the entire cost of digital security implementation on the
technology sector rather than on content owners.2M While the makers
of digital media technologies are required to implement security
standards in order to avoid liability under the law, the copyright
holders need not do anything at all. It could be argued that a bill
should better balance competing interests by forcing copyright
owners to find ways to compromise with the technology sector, in
order to permit both industries to thrive. Hollings's bill, in contrast,
places no such onus on copyright holders, who are allowed to exist
within the status quo of copyright protection while the technology
sector is forced to "get with the program" or suffer liability.
In short, the major P2P legislation proposed so far does not bode
well for the future of P2P technologies. Nor do these pieces of
legislation attain the fundamental "copyright vs. new technology"
balance that the Sony Court sought to achieve.2 65 Rather, much of the
legislation to date tends to tilt in favor of copyright owners and would
have the indirect effect of eviscerating much of the P2P technology
now in existence, some of which is arguably legal. This is due in large
part to the fact that the recording and film industries yield an
enormously powerful lobbying influence on Members of Congress,
whereas individual users lack a similar entity to advocate for their
interests.2 6 If Congress opts to step into the P2P debate in the wake
263. Norman, supra note 258, at 398.
264. Id.
265. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984).
266. This disproportionate influence at the congressional level may be changing,
however. One grassroots organization, for example, Downhill Battle, has mobilized
thousands of pro-P2P volunteers and is soliciting large numbers of monetary contributions
in order to advocate for the pro-P2P camp; the group has already mobilized an effective
public relations campaign, and assisted with a large number of amicus filings in the
Grokster case. See generally http://www.downhillbattle.org (last visited Nov. 29, 2005)
(mapping out strategies for promoting P2P technologies, and offering merchandise such as
tee-shirts and bumper stickers, to financially support those advocating on behalf of P2P
technologies). If the P2P debate shifts to Congress, it is likely that groups such as
Downhill Battle will attempt as much as possible to equalize the powerful lobbying
influence of the RIAA and the MPAA.
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of Grokster, it will clearly need to examine more progressive
legislative solutions beyond those proposed to date. Failure to do so
will result in an imbalanced solution to the P2P debate and will
thereby weaken the fundamental goals of copyright law.
If the bills that have been proposed do not offer solutions, what
other approaches could Congress take to address the P2P issue? The
most practical solution to the impasse would arguably be some type
of compulsory licensing scheme, which would set a rate at which
copyrighted works would have to be licensed for distribution over the
Internet. Such a system is already in place for mechanical-i.e.,
record and compact disc-reproductions of copyrighted works; 267 as
the argument goes, Congress could act to extend this licensing scheme
into the Internet realm, thereby allowing the distribution of content
over the Internet while guaranteeing just compensation to the content
owners. In fact, such a statutory licensing solution was originally
proposed for the film company plaintiffs in Sony; prior to the
Supreme Court's articulation of the Sony doctrine, the Ninth Circuit
had suggested that "a continuing royalty pursuant to a... compulsory
license may very well be an acceptable resolution" of the impasse
between the VCR manufacturers and the film companies.26 8 Of the
267. In 1909, Congress amended the Copyright Act to ensure that composers would be
paid for "mechanical reproductions" (reproductions on phonorecords and compact discs,
so-called cover recordings) of their music. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
"[Riather than granting the composer complete control over the right to make mechanical
reproductions, Congress [instead] gave recording artists a right to record the music, at a
price set by Congress, once the composer allowed it to be recorded once." LESSIG, supra
note 97, at 56. In other words, "[o]nce a composer authorizes a recording of his song,
others are free to record the same song, so long as they pay the original composer a fee set
by the law." Id. at 57. In effect, this statutory licensing rate "subsidizes the recording
industry through a kind of piracy." Id.
The proposed statutory licensing scheme mentioned in the pages that follow
should not be confused with the range of prevalent, legal music websites such as Apple's
iTunes service. While those sites are clearly legal, involving both consent and a
concomitant, though undisclosed, compensation to the copyright owner (calculated as a
percentage of the $.99-per-song fee paid by the iTunes end-user), such sites are not
mandatory, but are purely optional. In other words, copyright holders have a right to
choose or not to choose to license their copyrighted works to companies such as iTunes
(for example, the Beatles are notoriously absent from iTunes). Under the scheme
discussed in the pages that follow, in contrast, the statutory royalty would be compulsory
and would apply to all copyrights. Put another way, the copyright holder would not be
allowed to decide whether or not a work would be licensed to a P2P distribution company,
but Congress would ensure that the artist would get a royalty from each and every one of
those uses, based on the statutory rate.
268. Sony, 464 U.S. at 428. This royalty solution was revived more recently by the
Ninth Circuit in Napster, where the court considered whether it should impose "a
monetary penalty by way of a compulsory royalty in place of an injunction." A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001).
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myriad options Congress has before it in addressing the P2P issue,
this one is arguably best equipped to strike a balance between content
owners and new technologies. It will force copyright owners to work
together with online distributors, while ensuring that the copyright
owners are compensated for the use of their work. "Being forced to
deal with online distributors for a set fee may be an attractive solution
for the copyright owner, if the alternative is to receive no
compensation from [P2Ps] that profit from the unauthorized
269
distribution of her intellectual property.
In its simplest form, such a compensation scheme could be
created by imposing a statutory levy on: (1) the digital equipment
that enables digital reproductions of copyrighted works (such as
compact disc burners); (2) the media used to store digital copies (such
as blank compact discs); and (3) the P2P software systems
themselves. 27 ° The funds raised by such levies would be placed in a
fund-one administered by either the U.S. Copyright Office or a new
administrative body-and the monies from the fund would be used to
compensate copyright owners for the use of their works.271 Stanford
Law Professor William Fisher, who has recently undertaken extensive
studies of such a statutory proposal, theorizes that an 11.8% levy on
such digital media items would raise sufficient funds to compensate
the copyright owners for the losses "they have suffered and will likely
suffer in the future as a result of being unable to enforce their
copyrights" in the P2P environment. 272 Moreover, this type of levy
has been implemented by Congress before; in 1992, for example,
Congress passed the Audio Home Recording Act ("AHRA") 273 to
address the anticipated (though never realized) proliferation of DAT
recorders in the United States. The AHRA imposed a statutory levy
to be paid by the producers of blank DATs and DAT equipmentcalculated as three percent of the price of blank DATs and two
percent of the sales of such equipment-which monies were then
269. Norman, supra note 258, at 401.
270. See WILLIAM F. FISHER III, PROMISES To KEEP 216-22 (2004) (discussing how

taxation would be an alternative form of compensation for copyright owners).
271. To revert to our opening hypothetical, for example, such a scheme would ensure
that Eric's Bookster program would be permitted to thrive. While a statutorily-imposed
monetary levy would need to be imposed on Eric's Bookster software and other digital
devices such as eBook readers, Fisher's scheme would ensure that the Bookster program
would continue to proliferate (without any fear of future liability). On the other hand,
copyright holders in the literary works-such as Stephen King-would be fairly
compensated from the levy fund, thereby permitting them to work with P2P designers like
Eric rather than against them.
272. FISHER, supra note 270, at 208, 221.
273. Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000).
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deposited into a fund and distributed to the owners of both sound
recordings and the underlying musical compositions.2 74
However, a congressionally-mandated levy on digital technology
equipment will not solve the problem alone; after all, much of the
difficulty with P2P technology is that it is nearly impossible to
currently track exchanges of copyrighted works over P2P networks.
Copyright owners have worried aloud that a levy on digital
equipment would not adequately compensate them. 75 Consequently,
Congress's compulsory licensing scheme would additionally need to
mandate encoding requirements for all digital works-"fingerprints,"
so that the files can be identified and tracked-and would need to
establish an administrative body (either the copyright office or a
separate entity) to estimate the frequency with which each song or
film was downloaded or viewed by consumers.27 6 Each copyright
registrant would then periodically be paid by the agency, from the
levying fund, for the relative popularity of his work.27 7 The agency
would use a sampling system similar to Nielsen, either by randomly
selecting a set of entertainment users who were willing to allow the
agency to monitor what they listened to and watched, or by statutorily
mandating that all P2P software be designed with such monitoring
278
capabilities built in.
While a statutory licensing scheme would require significant
changes to the current copyright regime-Professor Fisher's work
speculates that it would require a congressional amendment to the
Copyright Act as well as a modification of existing international
copyright treaties279 -- such a scheme would provide compensation to
copyright owners for the use of their works, while allowing P2P
technologies (and the benefits that they convey on the public) to
thrive without fear of running afoul of the copyright regime. In short,
such a system would allow Congress to reconcile two goals that have
long been in conflict: facilitating innovation and ensuring that artists
are adequately compensated.2 8° These "safety valves" of a statutory
licensing solution28 arguably achieve the public policy balance that
the Sony court sought to attain with its original articulation of the
contributory infringement standard, and is arguably the best way for
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

supra note 39, at 162-63.
Lunney, supra note 174, at 855.
FISHER, supra note 270, at 203.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 227-78.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 239.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 39, at 20.
GOLDSTEIN,
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Congress to address the P2P issue in the wake of Grokster. Under
such a rubric
[c]onsumers would pay less for more entertainment. Artists
would be fairly compensated. The set of artists who made their
creations available to the world at large-and consequently the
range of entertainment products available to consumerswould increase .... Finally, society at large would benefit from
282
a sharp reduction in litigation and other transaction costs.
Unfortunately, a large number of events would have to occur for
such a royalty scheme to emanate from Congress. Congress would
need to be persuaded of the benefits of P2P; the RIAA would need to
be convinced that such a compulsory royalty would better serve its
long-term interests rather than attempting to stamp out P2P
technologies via litigation; and the compensation system would have
to be shown to adequately compensate copyright holders via an
effective system of copyright registration and sampling. Despite the
benefits of such a scheme, it seems highly unlikely that all of these
events will occur in the immediate future, especially with the
powerful lobbying influence that the RIAA currently wields over
Congress. In other words, unless the RIAA decides to suddenly
change its view of P2P software, perhaps spurred by a damaging
outcome in the Grokster case, a statutory scheme such as the one
proposed by Professor Fisher seems, regretfully, unlikely to
materialize in the short term.
CONCLUSION

The Internet and its concomitant proliferation of P2P
technologies in recent years pushed the doctrine of contributory
copyright infringement to its breaking point.
While Sony's
contributory standard of "capable of noninfringing uses" appeared
clear enough in the era of the VTR, it proved to be somewhat
unwieldy when applied to new technologies like P2P software. The
shortcomings of the Sony doctrine resulted in significant schisms
between the federal circuits over the scope of contributory copyright
liability; it was likely this inter-circuit split that motivated the
Supreme Court to step into the fray in 2005, in MGM Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd.

282. FISHER, supra note 270, at 203.
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In the wake of the Supreme Court's landmark decision in
Grokster, serious questions remain unanswered.2 83 While the Sony
standard did indeed survive the Grokster holding, and will certainly
continue to govern contributory copyright liability, the lower courts
must now factor in additional considerations of an inventor's "intent"
or "purpose" in distributing a new technological product. While it
appears that this "inducement theory" is intended to supplement the
Sony considerations without displacing them, it remains to be seen
how the lower courts will incorporate new questions of "intent" into
the Sony analysis. Regardless of how Grokster is construed by the
courts in the years to come, questions over the proper balance
between copyright protection and technological innovation will likely
persist.
The challenge of striking this balance is nothing new. In fact,
regardless of whether it is the lower courts of the judiciary or
Congress that ultimately decides to construe the scope of copyright
protection in the twenty-first century, they should be guided by the
underlying purpose of the Sony doctrine: striking "a balance between
the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation
of their writings and discoveries ...and ...the free flow of ideas,
'
information, and commerce." 284
Failure to do so could have
detrimental effects, not only on the future of P2P technology, but
more importantly on the public's interest in the free flow of ideas and
information.
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